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Technidigm-2000
Level One Opinions

A Question on Self Sustaining Nuclear Safety Cultures

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Mr. Jones,

I work for the New York Power Authority at Indian Point 3 Nuclear Power Station. I work in Nuclear Security and Fire Protection and I am currently working  on a Masters Degree in Labor and Policy Studies, with hopes of working in the HR/Performance area.  I have been reading the information on your website for the past few months and have become increasingly interested in the area of the Nuclear Safety Culture.

I am preparing to write a research proposal on creating and maintaining self-sustaining safety cultures as my Final Project. I believe, as you do, that this is a very important element of operating safely and increasing performance.

Unfortunately, there doesn't seem to be much information immediately available to me to  begin my research. I was curious if you might suggest some sources. I am particularly interested in management practices between top performing plants, and those that are marginal, organizational commitment, and safety measures, etc. (the human element  of promoting nuclear safety)

Any information you can give me will be most appreciated.

Patrick W. O'Hara
rescuer@banet.net

Patrick,

I guess you have your work cut out for you.  One of the central problems in the nuclear industry is that most of those people who really know how to do nuclear safety culture right are busy doing it and do not have time to write articles about it.  There is no easy reference list as far as I know.  There are many people out there promoting standard organizational niceties, trying to convert rather obvious practices found in successful industrial facilities to "how to get along better" ideas.  Much of this goes into "survey" projects to see what people think about their managers.  The NRC did this a couple years ago and found out that their management stinks.  They made some improvements, but it remains somewhat pathetic.

In my experience, a good nuclear safety culture that is self-sustaining only exists in the Navy program, primarily established and set in stone over the period of time that Admiral Rickover ran things.  It will take a while for lesser folks to disassemble the Navy nuclear safety culture.  Based on the Navy model and on what we had on the Nimitz Precommissioning Unit (1972-1975), I would say that the key to establishing a reasonably self sustaining nuclear safety culture is to start at the top.  Until the top guy understands and vigorously drives the organization toward optimal nuclear performance, nothing lasting will happen.  That top guy must have the motivation, drive, insight, and technical knowledge needed to do a good job.

The problem in most commercial utilities is that it is tough to figure out who is in charge.  Even when we figure that out, the guy we tend to point to really does not have the technical credentials and self confidence to take charge.  Some managers (eg, Corbin McNeil, Jr.) do have a reasonable amount of technical ability and are pretty successful.

Other aspects of this are that it would be easier to get to that self sustaining high level of nuclear safety culture if we had all the plants working under the same leadership, a central authority or leader with the power to shut a plant down with one phone call if he did not like what was going on.  Since there are so many diverse plants and designs, it is tough to find someone who could do this at the technical level, so there is little motivation for such centralization.

The efforts of INPO and the NRC to be surrogate mothers in this regard fall short due to lack of authority as well as lack of an effective central technical focus.  NEI is moving toward the central leadership position, and they may be more successful in view of the new regulatory oversight process that takes effect at all the plants in April (unless the NRC changes that one).  I doubt that they would ever reach the level of perfection that I would hope for, but they are currently the best hope in this area, having a reasonable amount of expertise, resources, and credibility.

I am not sure what I would go after if I were in your shoes and looking for a proposal as to what to do in this area.  In the academic environment, reality is sometimes not very important.  You could get a good grade even with something that is impractical.  Indeed, that is probably the best way to get a good grade, seeking logical and academic answers rather than real life, not so academic answers.

My Technidigm-2000 model provides the answer from my perspective.  It combines the academic with the practical.   I would propose just following that model.  This would mean filtering out the polarized information, laying down the principles, identifying the objectives and context, collecting opinions (such as this one), pulling actual experience together, going after the additional data that might be needed, identifying the decision maker who would be best to pull together a solution, laying out that solution with resources, coordinated organizational programs, pursuing the goals with the needed feedback overtime, and declaring success when the objective is reached.

For further insights into you specific questions, you might want to contact Jonathan Wert, who is more of an expert on some of those management and informational details than I am.  You could also inquire of NEI what they are doing in this area.  There are also nuclear safety related resources within DOE, some of which I think are more organized than the NRC.  The Department of Energy has codified a great deal of commercial nuclear industry and NRC insights into their relatively new programs, and they have many "Orders" and other documents available that bring together and "integrated" version of nuclear safety culture.  The Defense Nuclear Safety Board (DNFSB) has been driving the DOE, providing the leadership that they so badly need and can not muster from within.  The DNFSB probably has more authority over DOE facilities than does the NRC over commercial plants, so it is possible that they could serve as one more example of what it takes to force nuclear safety culture into reluctant organizations.

One other point that I would like to make, although it is probably obvious to you.  No nuclear safety culture program can be successful at the level needed unless it includes all the plants.  All the plants have to have a good nuclear safety culture if we are to avoid another Chernobyl.  This suggests the need to think globally, which is a much more difficult task that you should reserve for your doctoral degree thesis.

Good luck.  I would be pleased to hear more about your work as you progress.

Regards,
Charles R Jones
Germantown, MD
301 972 2017