Nuclear Safety Culture
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Multiple-Selection
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IMPORTANT NOTES: To "pass"
this quiz, you must submit an opinion on more than 40 (more than half)
of the questions AND achieve a score of greater than 50 points (out of
a hundred possible points) on those questions. You should read each
statement carefully and decide whether or not you agree that the concepts
stated are consistent with a good nuclear safety culture. The test
increases gradually in difficulty. If you do not understand a
statement, you should offer no opinion.
1. Nuclear Safety Culture is a part of the nuclear organizational
environment that is unique to the special safety requirements of the nuclear
industry. It is not enough to have a great organizational environment
alone.
2. The management and worker attitude at a nuclear plant should
support a "no fault" response to problems as long as each person does his
or her best. A worker can make an honest mistake without being penalized,
as long as the worker is forthright and timely in reporting or correcting
the error.
3. Strict, careful, and circumspect adherence to procedures and
a formal process for procedure correction prior to continuing work are
both part of a good nuclear safety culture. If the procedure is wrong,
we must place things in a safe condition and then stop work until the procedure
is formally reviewed and corrected.
4. Part of every job at a nuclear plant is ensuring that all
the paperwork is filled out and signed. The physical work can be
done perfectly in the field, but just one review signature or quality check
that is not properly obtained results in a failed job by definition.
Waiting for proper signatures and permissions is as much a part of the
job as tightening a bolt.
5. Repeating back directions or orders verbatim is an important
part of nuclear operations. Ambiguous or non-distinct words are to
be avoided. This is a special formality in communication and language
that seeks to avoid misunderstandings and, thus, mistakes. Reporting
that the ordered task has been completed is also important, and this must
also be formally acknowledged.
6. The potential consequences of a bad nuclear safety culture
are such that the entire nuclear industry worldwide can be affected
by even a relatively minor mishap at a single nuclear plant or facility.
Anyone working at a nuclear plant can potentially set up conditions leading
or contributing to such a mishap.
7. Consequences in a nuclear mishap include loss of life, plant
shutdowns for repairs and evaluations, destruction of some very expensive
equipment and facilities, and a range of possible radioactive contamination
problems both locally and, as in the case of the Chernobyl accident, worldwide.
8. A good nuclear safety culture helps ensure that the special
efforts required to achieve success on a daily basis at a nuclear plant
fall within the personal capabilities of each individual. When an
individual worker determines that this success is not a reality, it is
then the responsibility of that worker to take steps to insist that management
improves that culture. This includes the responsibility to notify
regulatory personnel if this becomes necessary.
9. If an individual does something wrong, it is far more important
to make it right than to seek to protect oneself from embarrassment or
the perceived responsibility for a schedule delay. Anyone who places
schedule over safety and plant reliability at a nuclear plant does not
understand the basics of nuclear safety culture.
10. There are potentially many individuals at a nuclear plant
or facility at any one time who are new to the nuclear safety culture,
unable to understand it, or unwilling to meet its challenges and requirements.
11. A plant with a good nuclear safety culture has strong organizational
interfaces internally and externally. Fewer problems are caused by
things that "fell through the crack." Everyone is responsible for
recognizing when organizational interfaces are involved in an activity
and in ensuring that communications across those interfaces are full, understood,
and timely.
12. People working at a nuclear facility are expected to answer
questions truthfully, and a frequent answer is "I don't know." No
one is expected to know all the answers. When you pretend that you
do not need to ask questions, you degrade the nuclear safety culture.
The proper action is to find the correct answer and verify it, not make
one up or guess.
13. Feel-good organizational niceties such as workers "getting
along" with their supervisor or management are not necessarily the first
priority when a nuclear facility's nuclear safety culture needs to be improved.
Indeed, until a good nuclear safety culture is established, we could expect
an increased level of effort, confrontation, and general conflict between
those who understand nuclear safety culture and those who do not.
In a nuclear facility, it is usually OK not to do what a supervisor apparently
wants you to do if you for some reason do not understand the action or
think that, based on your own training, it is wrong. Except (possibly)
in emergency situations where there may not be time to question directions,
an operator or worker should feel free to seek clarification.
14. The first person in the organization who should be "blamed"
for problems is almost always the person who is in charge of the nuclear
organization such as the Plant Manager.
15. In a good nuclear safety culture, none of the workers should
be concerned that they might lose their job if they make an honest mistake
during the performance of their work.
16. The primary function of management at a nuclear plant (and
perhaps managers in general) is to remove obstacles from the paths of the
workers.
17. Managers at a nuclear facility should promote a good nuclear
safety culture based on fundamental principles consistently applied.
They should be able to state those principles, and the principles should
be the same throughout the facility. It is the responsibility of
senior management to define and articulate the plant nuclear safety principles.
18. In a good nuclear safety culture, managers select, train,
and supervise all plant personnel, taking responsibility for work
accomplished and not accomplished. Thus, the workers are the last
people who should be blamed for problems.
19. Managers should manage the administrative environment so
that the organization promotes and does not inhibit excellence. It
is not appropriate to "pile on" elaborate administrative requirements without
ensuring that they are needed for defense-in-depth and that they are taken
seriously. Every required review and signature should actually contribute
to nuclear safety rather than just be a "rubber stamp."
20. Managers should communicate plant successes and failures
to the public and other stakeholders, soliciting participation and developing
community understanding and acceptance where possible. It is appropriate
to include the public and other stakeholders in nuclear facility inspections
and emergency plans to the extent feasible.
21. The phrase "defense-in-depth" means, in part, having backup
systems and people available to help identify, address, and resolve emergent
problems before they become uncontrollable or result in harm to people
or property.
22. At nuclear facilities we increase reliability by avoiding
"common cause" modes of failure. We do this by using diverse sources
of information, redundant instruments, separate systems, and fail-proof
methods whenever feasible. Nuclear safety culture includes ensuring
maximum reliability rather than marginal functionality.
23. In a good nuclear safety culture, senior operators routinely
observe the actions of junior operators in a manner that allows timely
intervention if a wrong action is about to be taken.
24. To maximize safety and minimize rework, the development of
approved design documentation and a good review of procedures should take
place well in advance of their expected use, allowing potential problems
to be identified during "dry runs." No one is expected to be able
to perform work or operations in a complex environment without planning
and coordination, or based merely on previous individual training and experience.
25. For some critical evolutions it is even appropriate to add
backup supervisors and double-checkers for key steps and for actions requiring
a high level of quality assurance or validation. Not only is it appropriate
to have someone check our work, sometimes it is appropriate to have several
different people with different perspectives or skills verify that what
we are doing is appropriate.
26. In a good nuclear safety culture, "verbatim compliance" is
expected. This means doing everything exactly as written and sequenced
in the procedure, all the time, and doing nothing that is not included
in the procedure. "Skill of the craft" actions should not be assumed
to be OK if they are not specified and included in a maintenance or modification
procedure. In a good nuclear safety culture, no one should insist
that "skill of the craft" actions are "assumed" in such procedures.
27. Unless a procedure specifically allows you to do otherwise,
you should do everything exactly as written and in the order listed in
the procedure, all the time. Procedures are more often too short
and generic rather than too long and detailed. If you are given a
procedure that requires "interpretation," then the procedure is not adequate
and should not be used. Nevertheless, you may find it to be necessary
to place a job or evolution into a safe condition when problems become
apparent, perhaps undoing something that was just done.
28. Verbatim compliance also includes ensuring that
you understand verbal directions by repeating them back in a manner that
allows the originator time to correct any errors.
29. Nuclear plant or facility design is controlled through a
program often referred to as "configuration management." It
is important to maintain control of the physical plant design using a comprehensive
formal program of design and procedural documentation. This helps
us continue to meet the "design intent" throughout the life of the plant.
30. Everyone at a nuclear facility is responsible for ensuring
that the plant design continues to be well defined and unchanged from the
specific, approved configuration management or design information.
Design information should be well documented, specifically identified and
controlled, understandable and manageable. Unnecessary duplication
should be minimized to avoid conflicts, oversights, and other errors.
31. A nuclear plant's design configuration is established and
maintained by meeting quality requirements in initial procurements, proper
installation, and comprehensive testing; followed by systematically meeting
the same requirements for modifications. This supports meeting the
original "design intent" even when it is not clear what that intent might
have been. "Design intent" should be understood before a design is
changed, but sometimes the intentions of the design engineers might not
have been documented. Thus, whenever possible, plant personnel should
document the "design basis" information that might be needed in the future
for operations, maintenance, and modifications.
32. Part of configuration management and design control is ensuring
that out-of-date documentation is systematically identified and updated,
or permanently removed from use. This avoids problems caused by using
inaccurate information. In a good nuclear safety culture, keeping
documentation up-to-date should be a proactive activity, although often
difficult. It is a key preventive measure for nuclear facilities.
33. It is often most difficult to manage design documentation
during transient circumstances that are caused by plant changes in progress
or by conditions that result in a project being only partially completed.
Drawings and procedures are in three possible states: original, transient,
and final. Proper management of transient design information is required
to prevent operators from relying on equipment that is not available, and
if properly used in the field, it helps minimize confusion when performing
other work packages.
34. In a good nuclear safety culture "life cycle maintenance"
programs address today's needs as well as those expected at the end of
plant design life. This allows proper planning and minimizes "work
arounds" that make plant operations less efficient and more complex as
the plant ages. Everything eventually becomes obsolete, so everything
needs to be considered in terms of when it will become obsolete, and plans
should be developed accordingly.
35. Proper planning includes anticipating component and part
obsolescence by identifying new vendors and procuring and installing modern
equipment in a timely manner. Advanced planning for replacements
also ensures that maximum advantage is taken of "design intent" knowledge
that may not have been adequately documented. Every component in
a nuclear facility should be the subject of a replacement plan as well
as a maintenance plan. This increases system and plant reliability,
which also contributes significantly to facility and system availability.
36. Personnel at well-run nuclear facilities are accustomed to
establishing and fully executing maintenance schedules and procedures that
are consistent with the required level of reliability for every component
and system. This includes planning and performing required preventive
and corrective maintenance within a design-intent framework, periodically
validating the long range plans against the intended design capabilities
of the plant under all conditions. This helps to maximize the availability
of safety systems and also helps to avoid having to shut down for unplanned
repairs.
37. Proper planning at a nuclear facility also includes consideration
of what will happen during the decommissioning and decontamination process
at the end of the facility's life. A nuclear plant's life-cycle includes
restoration of the site to a condition of being "environmentally friendly."
Decontamination needs, foreign material removal, rigging capabilities,
and movement pathways need to be anticipated. Likewise, it is up
to each individual to think in terms of such comprehensive needs, minimizing
radioactive contamination and other adverse conditions that might make
the end-of-life process (removal and disposal) more difficult than it needs
to be.
38. Management should respond to an incident in which a worker
removed a "danger tag" from a nuclear safety system without authorization
by reviewing the worker's hiring and assignment process as well as the
worker's training record, work record, safety culture attitude, and level
of work supervision in an effort to understand how such an obvious mistake
could happen. For example, sometimes workers are not told that removing
danger tags along with equipment being removed as part of maintenance or
modifications is a serious offense within the expected nuclear safety culture.
39. If management determines the worker knew that removing
a danger tag (or moving danger tagged equipment) without authorization
is a major procedural violation and that the worker was, thus, willfully
violating safety requirements, management should permanently remove that
individual from the plant. In addition to permanently removing nuclear
facility access authorization from anyone who willfully violates a nuclear
safety procedure, management should ensure that other nuclear facilities
are advised of this self-disqualification for nuclear work.
40. Nuclear facility managers should refer any willful incident
or problem that results in actual damage to law enforcement agencies for
further investigation and action. Even a seemingly minor action or
failure to act at a nuclear facility where safety is involved usually constitutes
reckless endangerment of others, but willful and malicious actions that
result in actual plant damage need to be prosecuted. Managers should
determine whether local laws are such that employees who willfully violate
safety procedures can be prosecuted for such actions and under what conditions.
Nevertheless, if a good nuclear safety culture exists at the facility,
prosecution should not be needed because such incidents will not occur.
41. When any mistake (accidental or intentional) is made at a
nuclear facility, managers should identify and correct any root causes
for this, including problems with worker selection, training, and supervision,
taking appropriate steps to avoid the problem in the future. Managers
should take and document specific corrective action steps within plant
programs, including notifying all other plant personnel of the incident
through formal training or "required reading."
42. For individuals who made an "honest mistake," nuclear facility
managers should ensure retraining of the individual and the responsible
supervisors, providing additional supervision as needed to ensure this
does not happen again. With such retraining completed and additional
supervision in place, managers should assume that a second occurrence of
the same problem, if it occurs, is willful.
43. In performing a plant operating procedure, the operator discovers
that a step states that a control switch is to be "turned" to the "on"
position, but the specified switch is a "pushbutton." In this case,
the operator should stop work, place equipment in a safe condition, and
notify plant supervisors. The operator can not continue until the
procedure is formally changed so that the switch mechanism can be pushed
instead of turned.
44. If a nuclear facility procedure is found to contain an obvious
mistake, the entire procedure and similar procedures must be reviewed for
additional errors since the presence of an obvious mistake indicates that
the procedure writers and reviewers did not understand important fundamentals,
such as how the system works.
45. Procedure development methods must be reviewed to determine
how a procedure that is found to contain an obvious error could be developed,
checked, and approved. When the procedure is corrected, the procedure
walk through must be completed (again) using the revised procedure to ensure
that it can be performed as written. Other procedures potentially
affected by such weaknesses must be rechecked and validated in a formal,
documented manner.
46. "Nuclear safety margin" is a conservative design allowance
between expected, worst-case system or plant parameters (anticipated in
all possible system conditions over the life of the plant) and a condition
that represents a nuclear failure. Failure conditions are unique
to each nuclear facility, but they normally include temperature and pressure
conditions under which nuclear fuel can melt or fuel elements can be damaged.
For some facilities, a failure condition exists if fissile materials
could achieve an unintended criticality.
47. An adequate nuclear safety margin includes allowances for
instrument errors and uncertainties as well as for protective system settings
and total, worst-case reaction times needed to protect against anticipated
transient conditions, including random system and operator failures.
48. Since nuclear safety margins are not readily tested and design
uncertainties can be difficult to quantify, conservatism is an essential
element of nuclear safety margin. Safety margin conservatism is cumulative
when worst case errors are added. Cumulative margins are preferred
to (safer than) averaged margins. Thus, when conservatism is "removed"
using averaging techniques (for example, combining errors using root-mean-square
averaging), the associated safety margins are no longer as robust.
Risk increases, even if slightly, but such increases should be formally
justified.
49. In most cases, mathematical calculations of system responses
and conditions are also approximate since they are difficult to model,
but also because most mathematical calculations are only approximations
or simplifications within the context of the underlying theories.
Thus, where feasible, safety margins must be demonstrated through direct
system testing.
50. To help ensure that nuclear safety margins will not be violated,
in addition to making safety margins conservative, nuclear facility managers
must provide a significant level of defense-in-depth and procedural control.
Nevertheless, all of this only minimizes risk and does not eliminate it.
51. Since we can not assume that we have anticipated every possible
adverse sequence of events, in a good nuclear safety culture we provide
additional barriers and containment to protect the public even if nuclear
safety margins are violated and even if we do not immediately realize that
this has occurred.
52. We do everything that we can in anticipation of a design
basis accident to minimize the potential consequences of that accident.
Equipment is designed to be reliable but to also fail in a safe condition
where this is feasible.
53. To properly design a nuclear facility to deal with emergency
conditions, we should assume that the initial conditions at the start of
adverse transients or accidents as well as our response capabilities are
in their worst allowable state. We should assume that operators are
slow to understand and react to changing plant conditions, and we should
minimize credit taken for operator intervention. Emergency procedures
only assist the operators in placing the plant in a safe condition; they
do not necessarily address all possible contingencies, although this should
be their objective.
54. We can improve system reliability using combinations of parallel,
series, and diverse components. Parallel or redundant systems and
components generally make a plant and its safety systems more reliable
as long as common-mode failures are prevented.
55. Series systems and components usually reduce operational
reliability, but they can be used to increase safety if the safety function
is intended to take place in response to a loss of power or other such
failure. When series components fail safe, the fail safe design is itself
more reliable.
56. Diverse designs and multiple vendor sources for equipment
are used to avoid common-mode failures. Working against equipment
diversity is the need to maintain equipment efficiently and minimize costs,
so in a nuclear facility having a poor nuclear safety culture, diversity
is often neglected or rejected.
57. Combinations of parallel and series components, as well as
the use of diversity, normally provide the best overall design in terms
of balancing plant reliability and safety.
58. The difference between instrument precision and instrument
accuracy is that instruments are considered to be precise when the same
input results in the same output, even if that output is wrong or outside
acceptable limits, and instruments are considered to be accurate when their
outputs have been corrected to fall within acceptable limits consistently.
To be accurate, an instrument normally needs to be precise. To be
accurate over a period of time, an instrument must be periodically checked
and adjusted to compensate for any gradual drifting away from its
initial setting. Instrument calibration programs must be based on
national standards to be considered acceptable in most nuclear programs.
59. When a component stops working and can not fulfill its intended
design function, it should be designed to "fail safe" such that the least
possible adverse consequences result from its failure. Reactor control
rods fail safe by automatically being inserted into the reactor core on
loss of power. Valves may be designed to fail open, fail closed,
or fail as-is, depending on what status is most favorable for safety.
System alarms, temperature and pressure indications, and automatic safety
systems or signals should fail such that the safety function is fulfilled,
except in cases where there is sufficient redundancy to achieve the function
reliably without using a fail safe actuation.
60. Where operational reliability and safety reliability are
both design priorities but require conflicting design features, relatively
sophisticated logic circuits can be used to distinguish between instrument
failures and actual safety problems or plant transients. For example,
coincidence circuits might require 2 out of 4 temperature signals to be
high before resulting in a safety function actuation signal, allowing one
temperature circuit to fail (but not two or more at the same time)
and still not receive the safety function actuation signal.
61. In "solid" conditions, a fluid system is filled with liquid such
that no gas or vapor space is present in the system. If a high pressure
fluid system such as a reactor coolant system is "solid," this means that
temperature changes (increases) can cause the system pressure to change
(increase) beyond a design limit and, possibly, rupture the system.
62. In some instances, "solid plant" operations are preferable
for controlling plant pressure. For example, pressurized water reactors
use electric heaters to increase plant pressure by adding heat to a water-and-"steam-bubble"
pressurizer. If the heaters are not available (perhaps due
to a cable fire), it is also possible for the operators to pump water into
the reactor coolant system to gradually "collapse the steam bubble" in
the pressurizer to either maintain or increase pressure. Pressure
increases cause a small "thermal layer" of higher temperature water to
develop at the steam-water interface. If the operators stop pumping
water into the reactor coolant system, the level in the pressurizer stops
increasing, the "thermal layer" starts to go away due to simple heat conduction,
and the "steam bubble" starts to collapse into the now colder water that
has been added to the pressurizer. Pressure can decrease rapidly,
and it probably would not be possible for the operators to then restart
the pumping and regain control of pressure. Also, the non-condensible
gases come out of solution, forming a gas bubble in the reactor vessel
and in the U-tube steam generators (stopping natural circulation) and in
the pressurizer itself (making it more difficult to "go solid").
The result is that the reactor core can be damaged unless the operators
collapse the "steam bubble" completely and regain pressure control using
"solid plant" operations.
63. Operators should be trained to understand the reasons behind
their operating procedures (the operating bases and possible system responses
or phenomena) so that they can deal effectively with unanticipated situations.
64. "Solid systems" are more susceptible to damage caused by
water hammer since there is less of a cushion when flowrates change sharply
(due to valves opening and closing or pumps starting and stopping) and
the piping system has to absorb momentum changes and the resulting pressure
spikes or pulses. Nevertheless, the presence of air or water vapor
in a fluid system can cause heat transfer problems that may be worse than
water hammer.
65. For fluid systems that need to be pressurized above the saturation
pressure of the highest system fluid temperature in solid conditions, it
is less likely that an operator using a centrifugal pump to maintain that
pressure will cause an overpressure condition than if the operator used
a positive displacement pump.
66. It is appropriate to maintain pressure in a fluid system
on the "shutoff head" of a centrifugal pump when a reliable means of maintaining
system pressures above saturation pressures is required, such as ensuring
that decay heat can be removed from a reactor core.
67. In high pressure systems such as reactor coolant systems,
pressure must be maintained high enough to keep gases from coming out of
solution so that important system capabilities such as natural circulation
are maintained. Even a momentary depressurization can result in gases
coming out of solution such that adverse gas bubbles are formed.
Gas usually comes out of solution a lot faster than it goes back.
68. The shutoff head of a system centrifugal pump should be less
than the design pressure of that system, making it unlikely that the pump
will cause a rupture or cause a relief valve to open. Centrifugal
pumps are often best because they normally are specified during the design
process to have a shutoff head (maximum pressure) less than the design
pressure of the systems they serve. They also usually have a higher
capacity
than positive displacement pumps, so they can maintain a higher pressure
while also making up for losses due to leakage.
69. Positive displacement pumps can overpressure a system more
easily than centrifugal pumps, and they usually have less capacity, but
they can be effective in maintaining system pressures above saturation
pressures in an emergency situation if there is a system relief valve controlling
pressure. Positive displacement pumps usually need to be attended
by an operator to control system pressure.
70. If the several thermocouples in a reactor core are indicating
that the reactor core or part of the reactor core is overheating, but the
other plant temperature and pressure instruments indicate everything is
normal, you should assume that the core thermocouples are accurate and
act accordingly. It is important for operators to "believe their
indication" and act on that indication, even if it seems strange.
Operators are naturally inclined not to believe their instrumentation when
it is reading beyond "normal limits." The reactor fuel or other critical
components can be overheating even when all other temperatures and pressures
are reading in the normal range. Indeed, this is the most likely
condition under which we might expect to experience core damage since the
operators could be confused by their conflicting system indications.
71. For operating as well as shutdown reactors, plant pressure
must be maintained high enough to ensure that a vapor bubble does not form
in the coolant system, especially in the fuel area since this would prevent
the removal of heat, causing the fuel temperatures to rise.
72. There are normally several temperature sensors in a reactor
core. When more than one sensor indicates a problem, there is probably
a problem. Also, if only one thermocouple (TC) or resistance temperature
detector (RTD) indicates a high temperature, it is still very likely that
there actually is a high temperature at that location. Since sensors
are usually placed at important locations, their outputs or readings must
be assumed to be correct and actions taken accordingly based on worst case
assumptions.
73. You inspect a large pump during normal plant operations and discover
that some of the casing nuts, although tight, are not fully engaged with
the studs or bolts that hold the casing together. You realize that
it is likely that the nuts are engaged sufficiently such that, even if
not fully engaged, the studs will fail before the threads strip.
Even if this is true, there is a significant problem because it is very
likely that the casing is overstressed in some places.
74. When any flange in a nuclear plant fluid system is held together
by bolts or studs that have under engaged nuts, even if only for one nut
on the flange, the expertise or training of the plant maintenance personnel
is probably inadequate.
75. Pump casings and piping system flanges, as well as other
places where nuts and bolts are used, require the use of special torquing
methods and sequences to ensure a balanced and adequate compressive force
all around the joint. Improper bolting can lead to leaks, casing
warpage, bent shafts, damaged shaft seals, and even gross failure of the
bolted joint.
76. Bolted joints are used primarily because they make component
maintenance easier than when welds are used. They usually require
a careful and uniform compression of a gasket so that a uniform seal is
created and leaks are avoided. Even so, the gaskets and joints
are likely to fail over time simply due to the effects of cycles of thermal
expansion and contraction.
77. Socket welds in piping systems are simple and relatively
inexpensive when compared with butt welds. It is easy to put a pipe
inside a socket fitting and weld the joint. Yet, this results in
the creation of crevices where it is difficult to flush out debris and
where radioactive materials can collect. Debris from lines that flow
into a reactor coolant system and that gets into a reactor plant can become
irradiated. The irradiated debris can collect at low points, crevices,
and other debris traps in the reactor coolant system, significantly increasing
radiation levels and creating "hot spots" that inhibit personnel access.
For this reason, although used in many such applications to reduce costs,
socket welds are not desirable for reactor coolant systems or for any system
normally serving a reactor coolant system.
78. It is important to maintain plant cleanliness at a nuclear facility
or nuclear power plant so that, in the event of a leak of radioactive liquids
or other radioactive materials, we minimize the probability that loose
debris or tools can become solid radioactive waste.
79. Trash can also be flammable, causing a fire hazard and resulting
in a possible violation of safety system or safe shutdown system fire separation
requirements. Trash and improperly stored equipment can interfere
with plant operations, especially during emergencies, and can become a
general personnel hazard. Likewise, proper painting, preservation,
and cleanliness increase plant and component life by minimizing rust and
other adverse conditions as well as making it easier to detect and recover
from plant problems.
80. If plant personnel are taking care of the "little things,"
such as plant cleanliness and corrosion control, it is likely that they
are taking care of the "big things." While not necessarily true,
this concept is often raised as a fundamental indicator by inspection teams
and other visitors who may be relatively unfamiliar with the plant and
by those who really do not understand the radiological consequences of
poor housekeeping. Nevertheless, in a good nuclear safety culture,
plant cleanliness and corrosion control are fundamental expectations.
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