Part IIIa:
The Supreme Court opinion and decision
in Morrison v. Olson is a consolidation
of the Court's usurpation of the executive power
of the United States Government

The Powers of the Independent Counsel

The Supreme Court makes Laws, hence
Usurpation of the legislative Power

Postscript on more Usurpations of Power by
the Courts of the United States

The Judges of the Courts of the United States
have not taken an unambiguous Oath
to support the Constitution

Oaths of Justices and Judges
 

Part IIIb:
The Unconstitutionality and criminal Improprieties
of the Powers of the Independent Counsel,
as authorized by the Ethics in Government Act

The Grand Jury Enquiry is judicial,
not prosecutorial

The unconstitutional Device of the Grant of
Immunity from Prosecution

Additional Points and Topics
on the Unconstitutionality of the
Independent Counsel Statute

The improper use of the grand jury

Granting immunity from prosecution
is improper

The Pardon Power vested in the President

Questions of Improprieties
of the Independent Counsel's Investigations

United States Attorneys ought to be
learned in Law

The President ought not execute
an unconstitutional Court Order

Dangerous Consequences of an Independent Counsel
prosecuting the President of the United States

The Supreme Court's Usurpation
of the Executive Power of Government

Broadening the Analysis of the Unconstitutionality
of the Office of Independent Counsel to include
the Supreme Court's Assumption of the sole Power
of the Appointment, Removal, and Direction of
the Marshal of the Supreme Court,
which is found to be also unconstitutional, as it amounts to
Usurpation of the whole Executive Power of the Government.

Thus, the "Independent Counsel" Statute, which has erected a Court-supervised Office for prosecuting high Officers of the United States, including the President, for alleged Crimes, and the Supreme Court's Morrison Opinion upholding this Statute, constitute the Supreme Court's Consolidation of its Usurpation of the Executive Power, which, by Article II, Section 1 of the Constitution, is vested solely in the President of the United States.

The Supreme Court opinion and decision in Morrison v. Olson is a consolidation of the Court's usurpation of the executive power of the United States Government.

As before mentioned, the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court, by the Ethics in Government Act, is empowered to "assign" (appoint) three judges to comprise a "Division" of the United States Circuit Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia (28 U.S.C. §49); and upon an application by the Attorney General, this "Division" appoints an "independent counsel" (an office created unconstitutionally by the Ethics in Government Act), and instructs this independent counsel in the articles of his criminal investigations and prosecutions, or in the words of the statute, "defines" the independent counsel's "prosecutorial jurisdiction." Should the Attorney General remove the Independent Counsel for a "good cause," the Courts of the United States, supervised by the Supreme Court, may "reinstate" the independent counsel, or the Division of the Court of Appeals of the District of Columbia may simply appoint another one. Thus, the Courts of the United States, and chiefly the Supreme Court, has assumed such "non-judicial" power as supervising criminal investigations and prosecutions, more specifically, the prosecution of high officers of the United States Government, including the President, for crimes, which power appertains to the enforcement of the laws, that is, the execution of the laws, hence the executive power of the Government,not the judicial power.

It has gone virtually unnoticed by the public that the Supreme Court also appoints, and removes, the marshal of the Supreme Court, an armed officer. (An official of the United States Marshals Service has informed this Author that the Supreme Court has made a rule which vests in the Chief Justice the power to appoint the Court's marshal.) This statutory special marshal for the Supreme Court (apparently created by a 1928 act of the Congress) is a change from the original 1789 law that had established a "marshal" for each district of the United States.⁽¹⁾ The 1789 law did not provide for a special marshall for the Supreme Court, nor the appointments of the "marshals" by any Court; thereby leaving the Constitution, Article II, Section 2, to prescribe the authority for appointing the marshals, namely, the President, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate.⁽²⁾

Thus, the Supreme Court has both the appointment and removal power of the Marshal of the Supreme Court. This special marshal is directed by present statute law to execute all process and orders of the Supreme Court. (28 U.S.C. § 672) This execution power includes the power to call on the "United States Marshals" for any needed assistance. These United States Marshals by the revised statutes are a different and an inferior class of marshals in relation to the Supreme Court's marshal; for the "United States Marshals" are, by the revised statutes, restricted to attend the district courts and the courts of appeals in their respective districts, so that the U.S. Marshal of the District of Columbia is not to attend to the Supreme Court, unless directed by a "lawful order."

Also, and more importantly, the United States Marshals are duty bound "to execute the lawful orders issued under authority of the United States" (28 U.S.C. §566). While a "lawful order" can be issued by the President of the United States, a "lawful order," by the said present statutes can also be a writ issued either by the Marshal of the Supreme Court, or the Supreme Court, or the Chief Justice, and directed to one or more of the United States Marshals, as may be deemed necessary, in order for the Marshal of the Supreme Court to execute the orders issued by Supreme Court or its Chief Justice. The United States Marshal may be confused as to which order to execute, a presidential order or an order issued by the Supreme Court Marshal; should these two orders contradict each other. However, since the Supreme Court holds the judicial power, and determines controversies, the United States Marshals, by the present statute, must obey ultimately, an order of the Supreme Court Marshal; for the statutory duty of the Marshall of the Supreme Court is expressly to execute the orders of the Supreme Court, and not, as in the case of the U.S. Marshals, "the lawful orders issued under the authority of the United States." The Supreme Court Marshal is by the present statute, therefore, expressly subordinate to the Supreme Court, and not to the President of the United States.

As the power of the marshals is to execute the Supreme Court orders and process, and since by the present statutes the Supreme Court Marshal is the supreme executive officer of the United States, who takes his orders from the Supreme Court, or the Chief Justice, it results that the Supreme Court has by the laws made by the Congress, acquired the supreme executive power of the United States Government, a fundamental usurpation of the executive power, taken from the President, in violation of Article II, Section 1 of the Constitution, which declares and directs that the executive power shall be vested in the President! It follows that since the subordination of the Supreme Court Marshal, under existing statute law, is clear (he directed by the Supreme Court or the Chief Justice), the United States Marshals must obey the writs of the Supreme Court Marshal, when called upon for assistance. The called-upon United States Marshals in turn are empowered to command all necessary assistance that they may require in order to comply with such a "lawful order"!

Now with the Supreme Court's acquisition of the supreme prosecutorial power of the Government, the power to investigate and prosecute the President of the United States for crimes, by the Attorney General's application for an appointment of an independent counsel for the purpose of investigating information of possible crimes involving the President, the Supreme Court now has essentially the supreme executive power of the Government, indeed, the whole power of government, by the independent counsel statute and the statutes which reorganized by "marshals" of the Courts.

The independent counsel statute, and the Supreme Court's (and the Chief Justice's) acceptance and execution of that statute, therefore, amounts to a consolidation of the Supreme Court's usurpation of the executive Power of the United States Government, but which power the Constitution vests solely and entirely in the President of the United States. Therefore, the United States Supreme Court now holds, but unconstitutionally, the supreme executive magistracy of the United States.

We can see, now, the full importance of the Supreme Court's decision in Morrison v. Olson: The Court's consolidation of the supreme executive magistracy of the United States. The Supreme Court commands and compels the President of the United States under the present statute law: commands, by exercising the judicial power, and compels by issues orders to its Marshal (and armed officer commanding all the United States Marshals and by them the posse comitatus) to execute orders or process against the President.

Like the "independent counsel", the Marshal of the Supreme Court, appointed and removable by a "Court of Law," can only be, following the theory of the Supreme Court's opinion in Morrison v. Olson, an "inferior officer" that the inferior officers appointment clause of Article II, Section 2 of the Constitution confers to the Congress the power to vest in the Supreme Court the appointment of a marshal with armed power to execute all process and orders issued by the Supreme Court or by any member of the Court, as the Chief Justice. Therefore, the inferior officers clause of the Constitution is definitely the supposed legal basis for the Congress's transfer of the executive power of the Government to the Supreme Court, and the Supreme Court's acceptance and acquisition of the executive power, by the devices of a Supreme Court marshal and the office of "independent counsel," both appointed as an inferior officer by a "Court of Law," as the Supreme Court has determined is permitted by Article II, Section 2 of the Constitution (the inferior officers appointment clause). Thus, the Supreme Court opinion in Morrison v. Olson has more importance than just keeping up an (unconstitutional) Independent Counsel statute: For the Court acted by its Morrison ruling to maintain that its unconstitutional executive power of its marshal.

In the next section the powers of the Independent Counsel as prescribed in the Ethics in Government Act are examined in more detail, to demonstrate further the usurpation by the Supreme Court, and the Chief Justice, of the executive power of United States Government the executive power having been taken from the President of the United States in violation of the Constitution by means of the agency of the Independent Counsel, which serves the judicial Department of the Government, and ultimately, the Supreme Court, and its Chief Justice, not the chief executive office of the United States, the President.

The Powers of the Independent Counsel

The Ethics in Government Act gives the Independent Counsel the full executive power of government to cause to be arrested and committed to jail, and to prosecute in the Courts, the highest officers of the United States Government, including the President, for any federal crime, including carrying the prosecution through to conviction, judgment, and the execution of the judgment the sentence. This law of Congress declares:

"Notwithstanding any other provision of law, an independentcounsel ... shall have ... full power and independent authority to exercise all investigative and prosecutorial functions and powers of the Department of Justice, the Attorney General, and any other officer of employee of the Department of Justice, ... Such investigative and prosecutorial functions and powers shall include:

(1) conducting proceedings before grand juries and other investigations;

(2) participating in court proceedings and engaging in any litigation, including civil and criminal matters, that such independent counsel considers necessary; ...

(7) making applications to any Federal court for a grant of immunity to any witness, ... or for warrants, subpoenas, or other court orders, ...

(9) initiating and conducting prosecutions in any court of competent jurisdiction, framing and signing indictments, filing informations, and handling all aspects of any case, in the name of the United States; ..."

Plainly, the Independent Counsel is given by this statute, in conjunction with the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, the power to cause a President to be arrested for a crime charged, as long as he presents a "complaint" to "any magistrate," which could be the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court, for instance. The said Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure prescribe that "if it appears that there is probable cause that an offense has been committed," a warrant or summons shall be issued for the arrest of the "defendant" (the person charged in the complaint with a crime); and the warrant shall be directed to any officer authorized by law to execute such warrants or summons. Such officer could be a United States Marshal, or the Marshal of the Supreme Court, who by statute (28 U.S.C. §672) is appointed (and removed) solely by the Supreme Court, and who is enjoined by the same statute to "serve and execute all process and orders issued by the [Supreme] Court or a member thereof [for instance, the Chief Justice]."

Thus, the statutory power of the independent counsel in combination with the statutory power of the Supreme Court constitutes the supreme executive power of the Government, being superior to the President of the United States; but in contravention to Article II, Section 2 of the Constitution. There is not even a definite requirement that the independent counsel must accuse the President by the indictment of a grand jury, as he could accuse the President by filing an information, which is the mode of prosecution defined by Blackstone, whereby a counsel for the government presents a formal accusation of a crime committed without the intervention of a grand jury. (This Author, and Citizen, raises the question whether it may be justifiable conceivable that the Courts could assume the power to dispense with a jury trial; even though Article III, Section 2 of the Constitution directs that the trial of all crimes shall be by jury, except in cases of impeachment. The questions needs a study.) That a criminal prosecutor has been established by statute and vested with such powers as enumerated above, and not be subordinate to the President of the United States, but quite to the contrary, the Independent Counsel is, by the statutes superior to the office of President, makes the independent counsel and the Supreme Court who ultimately supervises the independent counsel the supreme executive magistrates, plainly. This is surely a fundamental subversion of the Constitution. Such subversions of the Constitution ought to be made a high crime.

That the Independent Counsel is not, by the Ethics in Government Act, subordinate to the President, but serves the Supreme Court's usurpation of the executive power of the United States Government, is reflected in several noteworthy statements made by the Independent Counsel and in the Ethics in Government Act.

1. In his November 19, 1998 testimony before the Judiciary Committee of the House of Representatives Mr. Starr characterized his office by stating: "We are officers of the court ..." This statement is significant, as it reflects that he regards his office, as the Independent Counsel statute indeed directs, that the Independent Counsel is not subordinate to the President, but is an "officer of the court." Why not? His prosecutorial jurisdiction has been defined by the Division of the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia, in conformance with the Ethics in Government Act, which division of the court was appointed by the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court. However, under the Constitution, an attorney representing the United States in any judicial proceeding is an executive office, to be charged with the duties of executing the laws of the United States, hence is to be subordinate to the President of the United States.

2. The Independent Counsel statute (Ethics in Government Act) authorizes the Independent Counsel to conduct "prosecutions in any court of competent jurisdiction, framing and signing indictments, filing informations, and handling all aspects of any case, in the name of the United States." The vesting in the Independent Counsel the power to act "in the name of the United States" makes him the chief executive officer of the Government in so far as criminal prosecutions.⁽³⁾

3. In the Independent Counsel's questioning of the President of the United States before a "grand jury" on August 17, 1998, a deputy Independent Counsel who was conducting questioning stated, when not satisfied with Mr. Clinton's refusal to answer a question:

"Mr. President, I'm sorry, with respect, I don't agree with that. I'm not going to argue with you about it. I just am going to ask you again, in fact, direct you to answer the question."

To direct the President of the United States, who is vested by the Constitution with the executive power of the Government, assumes a superiority in authority, plainly.

4. Finally, the orders issued by the District Court Judge in the Paula Jones suit proceedings that directed Mr. Clinton to answer questions of a certain matter the matter of his sexual relations with other women used the language of compel when ordering the President of the United States to submit to such questioning. For instance, the Judge's December 11, 1997 order:

"For the foregoing reasons, the Court grants in part and denies in part plaintiff's motion to compel responses to interrogatories. The Court directs that responses to plaintiff's second set of interrogatories be provided to plaintiff in a manner consistent with this Order on or before Tuesday, December 23. 1997."

As proved elsewhere in the present treatise, the Courts of the United States have the power to issue writs, commanding that this or that be done, according to law. It is the executive power that compels the observance of the commands. So, the use of the word compel in Court orders reflects the assumption of executive power of the Government.

The Supreme Court makes Laws, hence
Usurpation of the legislative Power.

The federal statutes presently authorize the Supreme Court to make the "rules" of criminal procedure (28 U.S.C. §2072), which rules are the laws defining the procedure for criminal arrest, prosecution, and trial. The Supreme Court's assumption of the power to make the rules of "criminal procedure" (and the rules of "civil procedure" as discussed elsewhere) is plainly unconstitutional, as only the Congress by the Constitution is vested with the legislative power, the law making power. Thus, by the present statutes, the Supreme Court makes the laws that declares the criminal procedure; and they would then be the sole judge of the constitutionality and propriety of the rules which they make (and have made), which is plainly improper. They could dispense with the trial by jury in the criminal procedure, and dispense with indictment of a grand jury in cases of "infamous crimes," despite Amendment V; as they have dispensed with the trial by jury in civil suits, by ruling that the court judges have "gate keeper" powers to judge of the credibility of witnesses; though Blackstone made it clear that the jury judges the credibility of the witnesses, which is the essence of the trial by jury. These are just further outlines of the usurpations of power by the Supreme Court and the inferior courts of the United States.

Postscript

This is not all. The Supreme Court has assumed unconstitutionally the power to make the rules of civil procedure, and the rules of evidence, as well as the rules of criminal procedure, and so all of the rules are unconstitutional. Furthermore, even if the Congress had made the existing rules, these rules would still violate the Constitution, as is demonstrated in part V and VII of the present treatise: rules, for instance, that required, but unconstitutionally, Mr. Clinton to be examined in the Paula Jones civil suit proceeding in the United States District Court in Arkansas, and also rules that permitted the plaintiff's attorneys to question Mr. Clinton on matters that were not material to the issue of the Paula Jones case. These matters are delved into in this treatise because of the implications these findings have for the rights of all us persons who are in the reach of the federal jurisdiction.

And there is still more: (a) The Supreme Court Judges' cooperation with the improper, and unconstitutional, use of grand juries for making criminal investigations, as discussed shortly; and (b) Numerous decisions and opinions on "constitutional law" that this Author finds as wholly unconstitutional, such as, the Supreme Court opinions in McCulloch v. Maryland, and United States v. Curtiss-Wright, regarding the Court's doctrine of a vast mass of implied incidental powers vested in the Congress, and inherent powers vested in the President to manage foreign relations (to make war, for instance without any prior authority of the Congress, and to assist other nations in their wars and quarrels) findings to be demonstrated thoroughly in a forthcoming treatise and court filings. Because of these matters, and the already demonstrated unconstitutionality of the Independent Counsel statute, and the errors of the Supreme Court opinion upholding that statute, and because of the Supreme Court Judges' cooperation with the matter of the unconstitutional Independent Counsel statute: of the Court's unconstitutional making and executing their improper, unconstitutional rules of proceeding with civil and criminal suits, and rules of evidence: and finally also of the Supreme Court's assumption of the executive power of the federal Government, by its marshal, it is clearly important, before delving into them with the remainder of this treatise, to consider the requirement of Article VI of the Constitution that the Supreme Court judges shall be bound by oath or affirmation to support the Constitution of the United States, and inquire into whether or not the Judges have taken this required oath, as is discussed next; for it is found that the Supreme Court judges have not taken an unambiguous oath to support the Constitution.

The Judges of the Courts of the United States
have not taken an Oath to support the Constitution
of the United States.

The Judges of the Supreme Court have, evidently, not even taken the oath or affirmation "to support this Constitution," as is required by Article VI of the Constitution; but instead they took a different oath, an oath to perform the duties as judges of the Supreme Court according to their "understanding" of what the duties are, and to perform those duties agreeably to the Constitution and laws of the United States", a vague oath. The law which prescribed the oath for the judges of the courts of the United States, as it existed until 1990, and therefore, the oath took (presumably) by the justices of the Supreme Court that decided the Curtiss-Wright case, is quoted below in its entirety from Title 28 of the United States Code, section 453:

Oaths of Justices and Judges

"Each justice or judge of the United States shall take the following oath or affirmation before performing the duties of this office:

"I, ______, do solemnly swear (or affirm) that I will administer justice without respect to persons, and do equal right to the poor and to the rich, and that I will faithfully and impartially discharge and perform all the duties incumbent upon me as ____ according to the best of my abilities and understanding, agreeably to the Constitution and laws of the United States. So help me God." " (28 U.S.C. § 453.)⁽⁴⁾

Upon that oath, the Supreme Court judges were free to follow their own understanding of what their duties are as judges of the Supreme Court, and what are "laws of the United States," and what the Constitution means, and, therefore, were free to adopt the "inherent powers" doctrine of "external sovereignty<' as that which is agreeable to the Constitution and laws of the United States, because that doctrine holds that there exists inherent powers for the United States Government, and the President, which are not expressly prohibited by the Constitution.

Another fact of that oath is that the "laws of the United States" are given the same rank as the Constitution. Consequently,the judges of the Supreme Court have been free to form their decisions and write their opinions according to what the laws declare, and what they determine what the laws of the United States provide. If a law made by the Congress declares that the President shall be vested with a discretion power to act in a certain manner in international relations, and pertaining to a certain matter, the Court, in full compliance with the oath of office which they took, could create a doctrine of law, such as their doctrine of inherent external sovereignty powers, which by their understanding is "agreeably" to the law of the Congress. Plainly, the oath taken by the judges of the Supreme Court to perform their duties according to their understanding of those duties, agreeably o the laws passed by the Congress, is repugnant to the Constitution, as that oath binds the judges to support the laws, regardless of whether or not the laws are truly unconstitutional, leaving unconstitutional laws to prevail over the Constitution, since the Constitution is subject to "interpretation" and "understandings," and statute laws are generally more specifically defined.

Also, the question as to just what are the laws of the United States that the judges' performance of duties is to be agreeable with is left for the judges to determine, again, according to their "understandings." Are "laws of the United States" only the statutes enacted by the Congress? Only bills that are passed by the Congress that subsequently become law, either by the President's approval and signature, or by the re-passage of the bill by two thirds of both Houses in override of the President's objections? Upon analysis of the Constitution, the laws of the United States can only be those laws made by the Congress, as the Congress only are vested with the "legislative powers herein granted" (Article I, Section 1). But the Supreme Court opinions from the Marshall Court to the present reflect a different meaning of "the laws of the United States." In the case West v. American Telephone and Telegraph the Supreme Court in the year 1940 held that "laws" are "rules of decision commonly accepted and acted upon at bar and inferior courts." (311 U.S. 223) (By "rules of decision" they mean the laws upon which the decision of the court rests, and "at bar" means the full court.) This definition is a bold claim of the existence of a "federal common law," that is, unwritten laws established by custom and practice: unwritten in the sense that they are not prescribed by the Constitution or a statute passed by Congress, but are to be found in the decrees of the Supreme Court (the Supreme Court opinions) as authoritative and conclusive evidence of the "federal common law."

The existence of a "federal common law" is asserted in the official United States Congress's The Constitution of the United States Analysis and Interpretation:

"... The course of decision over the period of almost one hundred years was toward an expansion of the areas in which federal judges were free to construct a federal common law ..." (p. 737)

Said the Preface of that book, authored by the Chairman of the Senate Committee on Rules and Administration,

"... in a practical sense in contrast to what I earlier called a formal sense, "the Constitution," for purposes of analysis and interpretation, includes a great bulk of judicial decisions handed down by the Supreme Court, practically all of them at the behest of private litigants. These decisions, it should be noted, encompass not only an exposition of the private rights and the immunities claimable by citizens but also often substantially affect the distribution of governmental powers among those organs created by the document of 1787....

Because this is true, our system can and must place great faith in its judges and one sign of this faith is the exposition of constitutional interpretation which follows, reflecting some 183 years of judicial declaration on the meaning of the document. It is true, of course, that there are areas in which the judiciary does not intrude and therefore that the meaning of the constitutional provisions must be derived from custom and usage and shifting accommodations of the "political" branches of government."

As custom and usage are parts of the very definitions of the common law given in Blackstone's Commentaries on the Laws of England, it is clear that the Preface of the official United States Congress interpretation of the Constitution asserts the existence of unwritten laws, or a federal common law, that give the Government powers. The existence of a "federal common law" as part of the "laws of the United States," then allows the judges of the Courts of the United States, following their oath of office, to perceive any law they please, to promote the ambitions and activities of the United States Government to make war and dominate the world, as a law, or "rule of decision" that the United States Government is vested with powers of "external sovereignty" by virtue of the common law inherent in "nationality."

To be sure, the Supreme Court acts to treat its previous opinions as "laws" "rules of decision," or laws upon which they decided or dispose of cases. One instance is sufficient to prove the general. In the case United States versus Butler in 1936 the Supreme Court stated in an obiter dictum that the "welfare clause" of Article I, Section 8 is a grant of power in the Congress to spend money from the treasury without contractual obligations. (In Butler the Court held that the Agricultural Adjustment Act is unconstitutional, as it was a regulation of agriculture, and that the Constitution does not vest in the United States Government the power to regulate agriculture. The Court's opinion about the welfare clause was an aside, therefore,) In subsequent cases in which the constitutionality of the United States Government's "social security" laws and aid to housing" laws was in dispute, the Supreme Court refused to hear any debate on the meaning of the Constitution with respect to the welfare clause, ruling that it is "settled" law, that the welfare clause confers to Congress a grant of money spending power. Thus, the Supreme Court certainly regarded its previous Supreme Court opinion or decrees as laws. The oath taken by the judges allowed such a performance.

But that oath is unconstitutional. Contrast the statutory oath with the oath required by Article VI of the Constitution:

"The Senators and Representatives before mentioned, and the Members of the several State Legislatures, andall executive and judicial Officers, both of the United States and of the several States, shall be bound by Oath or Affirmation, to support this Constitution."

The very first law of the United States Congress (1789) shows that the first Congress understood Article VI correctly. For they directed all executive and judicial officers to take the oath:

"I, A.B. do solemnly swear or affirm (as the case may be) that i will support the Constitution of the United States."

It is significant that this oath is declared in the first section of the very first law made by the Congress, June 1, 1789. But that law was subsequently confounded by the additional or replacement oaths that give the judges the license to perform as they understand their duties and what is agreeable or under the laws of the United States, as well as the Constitution. Compare the oath required of the judges of the courts of justice in England according to Blackstone's Commentaries with the oath required by Article VI of the United States Constitution. Said Blackstone of the "judicial decisions,"

" ... the judges in the several courts of justice ... are bound by an oath to decide according to the law of the land. Their knowledge [understanding] of that law is derived form experience and study; ... from being long personally accustomed to the judicial decisions of their predecessors. Indeed these judicial decisions are the principal and most authoritative evidence, that can be given, of the existence of such a custom as shall forma a part of the common laws." (I, Introd., § 3, p. 69)

Again, Article VI of the United States Constitution:

" ... and all executive and judicial Officers, both of the United States and of the several States, shall be bound by Oath or Affirmation, to support this Constitution."

So, by the Constitution of the United States the judges of the Courts of the United States, judicial officers, are not to be bound by oath to decide their cases, to perform their duties, according to the laws of the United States, or their knowledge of the laws; but are, pure and simple, to be bound by oath or affirmation to "support this Constitution" the Constitution of the United States.

The difference between the oath of the judges under the British Constitution and the judges of the Courts of the United States under the United States Constitution is plainly significant, and not a casual difference. Article III of the Constitution of the United States vests the "judicial power" in the Supreme Court and such inferior courts as the Congress may ordained and establish by law; and directs that "The judicial Power shall extend to all Cases in Law and Equity arising upon this Constitution and the Laws of the United States," &c. Therefore, the judges of the courts of the United States are to bound by oath "to support his Constitution," and therefore, they ought to find out just what their duty is in fulfilment of that oath to support the Constitution of the United States: that duty is to exercise the judicial power in the suits that fall under their jurisdiction, to determine the law arising upon the facts of each case in law, and to determine the complaints in suits in equity. Their duty is to support the Constitution of the United States as the People ordained and established it, and nothing else: not their understandings: not a federal common law: not their prior judicial decisions and precedents.

The preceding considers the matter of the oath to support the Constitution as a fundamental requirement. Next, the particular oaths which the Judges probably have taken, are reviewed with attention to the Court's usurpation of the executive power of the Government.

The Judges of the Courts of the United States,
including the Supreme Court, have not even taken
an unambiguous Oath to support the Constitution
of the United States.

And perhaps they have taken an Oath
like the Oath prescribed for the executive Magistrate,
of Sovereign, to defend the Constitution.

Only the President, by the Constitution, is required the oath and duty to defend the Constitution, that is, he employs and commands the force of the society, not the Supreme Court judges. The President's oath, as prescribed by the Constitution:

"I do solemnly swear (or affirm) that I will faithfully execute the Office of President of the United States, and will to the best of my Ability, preserve, protect and defend the Constitution of the United States."

Also, Article VI of the Constitution requires,

"The Senators and Representatives before mentioned, and the Members of the several State Legislatures, and all executive and judicial Officers, both of the United States and of the several States, shall be bound by Oath or Affirmation, to support this Constitution; ..."

The original oath required of all officers of the Government, including the judges, that was enacted into law in 1789, namely, the very first section of the very first statute passed by the Congress, correctly complied with the Constitution: The 1789 law required each officer of the United States to swear or affirm purely and simply that:

There were no qualifications or ambiguous attachments to the promise! There is a question whether or not the judges of the Supreme Court have taken this oath. The United States Code seems to indicate that that 1789 law has been forgotten or superseded. The statutory oath specifically for judges of the Courts of the United States has not included this oath (see 28 U.S.C. §453). There is a "Title V" oath for officers of the Government (but for the judges included?) which reads "support and defend the Constitution against all enemies foreign and domestic." By assuming the duty or swearing to defend the Constitution, if the judge takes that oath in addition to the §453 oath (discussed below), does that make the Supreme Court judges think that they can take the executive power of the Government? as they have in fact done, by appointing an armed marshal to attend to their Court with the duty to execute all of the process and orders issued by the Court or any of its member judges, which marshal is, by statute, subject to removal only by the Supreme Court (28 U.S.C. §672).

Also, if the judges have taken the oath to support and defend the Constitution against all enemies &c., would this not be a bit of ambiguity, allowing each judge to construe the oath as undertaking only an the obligation to defend the United States when under an attack, or to construe the oath as applying to such kinds of remotely possible situations that might possibly arise that in the opinion of a judge would constitute an attack on the Constitution, like a military commander carrying out a coup, or the President abolishing the House of Representatives. The standing oaths are ambiguous at least; and so there is no real binding the Supreme Court judges by oath that they "will support the Constitution of the United States," period!

The oath prescribed for the judges of the United States Courts was for a long time, "I will faithfully execute the duties of his office, according to the best of my abilities and understanding, agreeably to the Constitution and the laws of the United States." The present statutory oath is even more ambiguous, "I promise to execute my duties as judge, under the Constitution and the laws of the United States" (28 U.S.C. §453). Again, what are his duties? Also, by the oath, the laws are equal to the Constitution. The Supreme Court dicta on the Constitution were issued by judges taking these ambiguous oaths, allowing them the license to execute their duties of judging causes according to their understandings of the Constitution, with the laws of the United States being placed coequally with the Constitution. So such oaths allow the judges to follow their own bents (called "understandings") as to the meaning of the Constitution to pronounce; instead of honestly finding out by study and investigation, inquiry, and deliberation upon solemn argument by the parties or their counsel, just what the people who ordained and established the Constitution must have certainly intended the Constitution to mean, and supporting the Constitution as the People certainly intended.

1. Section 27 of the Act to establish the Judicial Courts of the United States, Sept. 24, 1789.

2. ** It should be mentioned that the name "marshal" appears in Blackstone's Commentaries on the Laws of England (III, 42, 285) as not an officer of executive magistracy, but is indicated by Blackstone to be an armed officer of the Court, who attends to the Court for protection of the Court judges, jury, and other participants in the court proceedings. There is no indication that a "marshal" of the laws of England held the power to execute the process and orders of the courts. Such powers are the business the sheriff and his subordinate officers, according to Blackstone. So, it would seem that the 1789 Act of the Congress establishing the Judicial Courts of the United States, which prescribed the division of the United States into thirteen "districts," and a "marshal" for each district, and which vested each marshall with the power and duty to execute "all lawful precepts ... issued under the authority of the United States," had used a somewhat erroneous term by the name "marshal." It would have been more appropriate to name the officer a "district marshal," so as not to imply that the officer is a "marshal of the court," or the "court's marshal," which clouds the subordination. For the marshal or officer for executing the orders and process of the Courts is an executive office, under the Constitution of the United States, subordinate, therefore, to the President, who is vested with the executive power.

3. * In the "Monica Lewinsky Immunity Deal" made by the Independent Counsel, it states:

"This is an agreement between Monica S. Lewinsky and the United States, represented by the Office of Independent Counsel."

4. * The present statutory oath of Section 453 is even more vague:

Oaths of Justices and Judges:

"Each justice or judge of the United States shall take the following oath or affirmation before performing the duties of this office:

"I, ______, do solemnly swear (or affirm) that I will administer justice without respect to persons, and do equal right to the poor and to the rich, and that I will faithfully and impartially discharge and perform all the duties incumbent upon me as ____ under the Constitution and laws of the United States. So help me God."

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