President Clinton was unlawfully compelled
by the federal Judiciary to stand the Paula Jones Suit,
and to submit to Interrogation, called "Discovery,"
which was essentially a "compulsive Examination"
of a party, not a witness, and was unlawfully interrogated
on Matters that were not material to the Issue of the Suit;
and, therefore, he committed no Crime of corrupt Perjury
by his Testimony, being Answers to Questions
of his private Life,
which naturally were given to protect himself,
Family, Friends and Associates from Intrusion.

Table of Contents

1. The Supreme Court Decision in Clinton v. Jones

was oppressive, being founded on unconstitutional

Supreme Court Doctrine of Presidential Immunity

from civil Suits at the Discretion of the Judiciary,

and therefore did Mr. Clinton wrong. 2
 

2. The compulsive Examination of Parties of a civil Suit,

as permitted by the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure,

is unconstitutional hence, the compulsory Deposition

of Mr. Clinton in the Paula Jones Suit was unlawful. 3
 

3. The Federal Rules of Evidence are unconstitutional,

Rules which permitted the Court in the Paula Jones Suit

to direct Mr. Clinton to answer Questions of "other Women,"

Facts about which were not in Issue in the Suit. 4
 

Rules 401 and 402 of the Federal Rules of Evidence 5

Rule 401. Definition of "Relevant Evidence" 5

Relevant Evidence, by Rule 401 Chart of Elements 7

Legal Evidence, by Blackstone Chart of Elements 8
 

4. Judge Wright's Order requiring Mr. Clinton

to submit to a Deposition and answer Questions

about "other Women," while deferring a Ruling

on whether such Evidence will be admissible at Trial,

is a further Nonsense, as well as unconstitutional,

and is indicative of oppressive Behavior of the Courts. 16
 

5. Presumption of tyrannical Partiality

of the Judges of the District Court,

the Appeals Court, and the Supreme Court

in the Matter of the Paula Jones Suit. 17
 

6. The Supreme Court with its Marshal

coerced the President. 20
 

7. The Question of the Jurisdiction

of the federal Courts to have Cognizance

of the Paula Jones Suit. 21

Existence versus Truth 22
 

Federal Rules of Evidence 22

Rule 401. Definition of "Relevant Evidence" 22
 

Rule 603. Oath or Affirmation 24
 

A Digression on the "matters before the Court." 26
 

Resuming the Analysis of the Federal Rules of Evidence

with respect to truth. 32
 

Oath to Jurors in Civil Case (U.S. Courts) 33
 

Amendment VII of the Constitution 36
 

Positive Proof and Circumstantial Evidence 41
 

Proof that the Leading Maxims on legal Evidence

laid down in Blackstone's Commentaries on the Laws of England

is the Law of Evidence binding the Courts of the United States

under the Constitution 44
 

The Independent Counsel's Reference

to the "Law of Evidence" that

permitted Questions on "other Women." 55

Rule 401. Definition of "Relevant Evidence" 57

Rule 402. Relevant Evidence Generally Admissible;

Irrelevant Evidence Inadmissible. 57

Rule 404. Character Evidence Not Admissible to prove

Conduct; Exceptions; Other Crimes 57
 

Further Proof of legal Evidence

under the Constitution of the United States

provided by the Unanimity Rule for Jury Verdicts. 64
 

President Clinton was unlawfully compelled

by the federal Judiciary to stand the Paula Jones Suit,

and to submit to Interrogation, called "Discovery,"

which was essentially a "compulsive Examination"

of a party, not a witness, and was unlawfully interrogated

on Matters that were not material to the Issue of the Suit;

and, therefore, he committed no Crime of corrupt Perjury

by his Testimony, being Answers to Questions of his private Life,

which naturally were given to protect himself,

Family, Friends and Associates from Intrusion.
 
 

1. The Supreme Court Decision in Clinton v. Jones

was oppressive, being founded on unconstitutional

Supreme Court Doctrine of Presidential Immunity

from civil Suits at the Discretion of the Judiciary,

and therefore did Mr. Clinton wrong.
 

The Supreme Court decision in Clinton v. Jones (1997), which denied Mr. Clinton's motion to stay the Paula Jones suit until he leaves the office of President of the United States, and which in effect ordered that President Clinton to subject himself to the Paula Jones civil suit, that is, to stand the suit, and which resulted in Mr. Clinton being ordered by the District Court to submit to a deposition, that is, a compulsory examination of Mr. Clinton under oath by the plaintiff's attorneys, violated the Constitution of the United States, as an oppressive abuse of the judicial power under the Constitution, being founded on an erroneous Court opinion a Supreme Court-made "doctrine" of presidential immunity by judicial discretion. The President's motion in the Paula Jones suit, namely, to dismiss the suit "without prejudice" to the plaintiff, but allowing her to re-file her suit in the United States Courts after Mr. Clinton's term of office expires, was properly founded on Article II, Section 3 of the Constitution, particularly, the directive, that the President "shall take Care that the Laws be faithfully executed," and the President's oath of office, "I do solemnly swear that I will faithfully execute the Office of President of the United States, and will to the best of my Ability, preserve, protect and defend the Constitution of the United States."
 

The Supreme Court's opinion in Clinton v. Jones, given as the ground for the Court's decision, disregards the Article II, Section 3 of the Constitution, and instead asserts a Supreme Court "doctrine" of presidential immunity from law suits, except in "appropriate circumstances" at the discretion of the Court. This doctrine is not expressed in the Constitution, but is merely Supreme Court dictum, and is unconstitutional. A President by the Constitution has no immunity from lawsuits; but he could plea for a stay of a suit, if the suit does not charge the President with any violations of the Constitution or the laws of the United States. As the Supreme Court opinion in Clinton v. Jones is not supportive of the Constitution, the Court's decision in that case to compel Mr. Clinton to submit to the Paula Jones suit, and to undergo a compulsive examination under oath in a deposition, was oppressive, and therefore, unconstitutional.
 

The Court opinion is wholly unfounded and arbitrary, including a section which outright makes a mockery of the Constitution, and of the People who ordained and established it, and ought to have been disregarded by the President, in compliance with his oath to preserve the Constitution. The full proof of this finding is given in Part VI.
 
 
 
 
 

2. The compulsive Examination of Parties of a civil Suit,

as permitted by the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure,

is unconstitutional hence, the compulsory Deposition

of Mr. Clinton in the Paula Jones Suit was unlawful.
 

The District Court's order compelling Mr. Clinton, under threat of a criminal contempt citation and other adverse consequences, to answer under oath written interrogatories and questions in an oral examination (a deposition), discovery proceedings under the so-called "Federal Rules of Civil Procedure," which permit such a compulsive examination of a party, as the defendant, in a "civil action," violated the Constitution, Article III, Section 2, which expressly provides for the distinction between cases in law and cases in equity. The compulsive examination of a party to a civil suit in equity is the essential difference in the mode of proof, or the form of evidence, in these two distinct species of judicial proceedings, namely, the proceedings for suits at law and those for suits in equity. When the Constitution was ordained, it was an established legal principle that in a suit which is under the ordinary jurisdiction of the courts of justice, a "compulsive discovery" by the oath of parties (not to be confused with witnesses to a fact who are not parties to the suit) is not permitted, and for good reasons.
 

By this legal principle, the compulsive examination of a party is permitted only in the proceedings in courts of equity; and then suits in equity were allowed only in "rare and extraordinary" cases, where an adequate relief cannot be obtained by an action at law, or when the facts of the case, or their leading circumstances, rest only in the knowledge of the party. The reasons for not permitting compulsive examination of the parties in ordinary suits, that is, in actions at law, was to avoid all temptations of perjury, and thereby to settle or terminate disputes justly, and thus to quiet the contention, not to stir up contention and strife.
 

The Supreme Court has made the rules of procedure for civil cases, however, which abolished the Constitution-mandated distinction between cases in law and cases in equity, by subjecting the defendant in any civil suit to a compulsive examination, which is a violation of the Constitution, and a violation of the established principle underlying the Article III, Section 2 distinction between "cases in law" and "cases in equity," namely, that "fault is not to be wrung out" of a person charged with wrong doing, "but rather to be discovered by other means, and other men." (Blackstone's Commentaries, IV, Ch.22, p.293). Moreover, the Supreme Court is not vested with the legislative power to make the rules of proceeding in the Courts of the United States, rules which are laws of the utmost importance to the individual's rights of life, liberty, property, and therefore, the Supreme Court's making of these rules is a usurpation of the legislative power, making the compulsive examination of the parties as required by these rules, doubly unconstitutional. The full proof is given in Part VII.
 
 
 
 
 

3. The Federal Rules of Evidence are unconstitutional,

Rules which permitted the Court in the Paula Jones Suit

to direct Mr. Clinton to answer Questions of "other Women,"

Facts about which were not in Issue in the Suit.
 

The District Court's order requiring Mr. Clinton to answer discovery questions about his alleged relationships with "other women" is founded on Rule 401 of the Federal Rules of Evidence, which were made and prescribed by the United States Supreme Court. This rule allows as "relevant evidence" any thing that merely tends to make more probable the "existence" of a fact which is considered by the judge to be of consequence in the court's determination of the suit, the fact spoken of being not necessarily the fact at issue in the suit. In the Paula Jones suit the fact in issue was: Did the defendant sexually harass the plaintiff? The theory of evidence about "other women," which was judged by the Court to be "relevant" under Rule 401, is that it may indicate a "pattern" of conduct that would tend to make it more likely that the defendant Clinton had sexually harassed the plaintiff Jones as alleged.
 

This Rule 401, and related rules of the Supreme Court's rules of evidence, however, violates the tenor of the Constitution in regards to the object of the Constitution, "to establish Justice," and the meaning of the judicial power which Article III, Section 1 of the Constitution vests in the Courts of the United States. For the courts of justice, by the tenor of the Constitution, are to examine the truth of the fact in issue in the action, and to admit evidence only to this point, according to the leading maxim on legal evidence admissible at trial that was the common law when the Constitution was made; the established definition of trial being, the "examination of the matter of fact" in issue." That leading maxim on legal evidence was laid down in Blackstone's Commentaries on the Laws of England, to wit:
 

"And, first, evidence signifies that which demonstrates, makes clear, or ascertains the truth of the very fact or point in issue, either on the one side or on the other; and no evidence ought to be admitted to any other point." (III, Ch. 23, p. 367)
 

This is the proper rule of evidence in accordance with the Constitution of the United States, the rule that was certainly intended by the people who ordained and established the Constitution, to be demonstrated below.
 

The Rule 401 of the Federal Rules of Evidence, however, defines evidence as that which may be admissible as "relevant evidence." Its defining rule is wholly different than the leading maxim of Blackstone's exposition. The Rule 401 is as follows:
 

Rule 401. Definition of "Relevant Evidence"

"Relevant evidence" means evidence having any tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action more probable or less probable than it would be without the evidence.

Rule 402. Relevant Evidence Generally Admissible; Irrelevant Evidence Inadmissible.

"All relevant evidence is admissible, except as otherwise provided by the Constitution of the United States, by Act of Congress, by these rules, or by other rules prescribed by the Supreme Court pursuant to statutory authority. Evidence which is not relevant is not admissible."
 

Rule 401 is manifestly a fundamental departure from the leading maxim on evidence as set forth in Blackstone's Commentaries. The maxim given in Blackstone's Commentaries is strict; the Rule 401 is completely liberal and discretionary. In the Paula Jones suit, evidence on Mr. Clinton's relations with "other women" could not make clear or ascertain that Mr. Clinton, the defendant, had sexually harassed the plaintiff, Ms. Jones, as she alleged, the fact which was in dispute in the case; and so, evidence on the matter of "other women" would not be admissible under the maxim given by Blackstone. But such evidence could be "relevant" for discovery and admissible at trial, under Rule 401 of the Federal Rules of Evidence, should the Judge in the Paula Jones proceeding rule that such evidence is "relevant," or more specifically, should the Judge decide that any facts of Mr. Clinton's sexual relations with "other women" are of "consequence" in deciding the case.
 

Plainly, Rule 401 confers to the Judge discretionary power to decide on relevancy of evidence for discovery and trial. That this Rule 401 is completely discretionary (without any bounds) is shown in the following analysis. To aid in this analysis a chart for each rule is given in the following pages.
 

The "leading maxim" on legal evidence as given by Blackstone was evidently the intent of the makers of the Constitution, when they vested the "judicial Power" in the Courts of the United States. The Constitution provides for a "supreme Court," and "inferior Courts" to be "ordained and established" by the Congress, and vests in these courts the "judicial Power," with the object, "to establish Justice." We must then look to the definition of "courts of justice," thedefinition of "judicial power," and the definition of "justice," that were evidently understood and intended by the People who ordained and established the Constitution. These definitions are laid down in Blackstone's Commentaries, that eminent treatise and exposition of the British Constitution and the laws of England of that time. Said Blackstone,
 

"A court is defined to be a place wherein justice is judicially administred." (III, Ch. 3)

"In every court there must be at least three constituent parts, the actor, reus, and judex: the actor, or plaintiff, who complains of an injury done; the reus, or defendant, who is called upon to make satisfaction for it; and the judex or judicial power, which is to examine the truth of the fact, to determine the law arising upon that fact, and, if any injury appears to have been done, to ascertain and by it's officers to apply the remedy." (III, Ch. 3, p. 25)
 

Said Blackstone, the members of the jury, the tribunal of the court sworn to examine and determine the truth of the very fact in issue, namely, the fact of the injury complained of, are:
 

"separately sworn, well and truly to try the issue between the parties, and a true verdict to give according to the evidence." (III, Ch. 23, p. 365)
 
 

The "constitution and frame" of this "tribunal," said Blackstone, is "excellently contrived for the test and investigation of truth; ..." (III, 365) The legal evidence to a jury, said Blackstone, signifies "that which demonstrates, makes clear, and ascertains the truth of the very fact or point in issue, ... and no evidence ought to be admitted to any other point." (III, Ch. 23, p. 367)But by Rule 401 of the Supreme Court's prescribed rules of evidence, "evidence" which could be given to the jury is not that which demonstrates, make clear, and ascertains the truth of the very fact or point in issue in the suit, but any testimony or other thing that merely tends to make the existence (not the truth?) of some fact (not necessarily the very fact in issue) more probable than not, which fact needs only to be, in the mind of the judge who is to rule on the relevance of the evidence for discovery, or to admit the evidence in the trial, of some "consequence" to the determination of the suit; where "determination" here means "termination." This Rule 401, thus, is not a restricted definition, as is Blackstone's maxim, which restricts the evidence to that which demonstrates, makes clear, or ascertains the truth of the very fact in issue; but rather, Rule 401 os an arbitrary rule of unlimited liberality, a discretion power vested in the court judge.
 

Observe also that the Supreme Court in making the rules of evidence shied away from the truth, preferring instead to use the word "existence" for a criterion of admissibility of evidence. The avoidance of truth is significant. We all know what is meant by the "truth." But the "existence?" It is another hedge word, plainly. Thus, Rule 401 allows the judgment of the suit to rest on mere probabilities, as "more likely than not;" and indeed, it rests on remote probabilities, as the "evidence" need only tend to make the existence of a fact more likely than not. And further, this remoteness of probabilities is compounded by the other part of the rule that allows such evidence of such fact that is, in the mind of the judge, merely of some consequence to the determination of the suit.
 

Observe also that by the Rule 401 the object of the "relevant evidence" as defined by the rule is the determination of the suit, not the finding of the truth not to establish the truth of the very fact at issue in the suit: not to find out the truth, but to terminate the suit, that is, to determine the action, which is still another oppressive aspect of the Supreme Court's decreed Rules of Evidence. So, the object of the court's "determination of the action" is not to establish justice, as the preamble of the Constitution requires, not to establish the truth and render justice to the parties of the suit, but what ever is the private object held by the judge of the court, and ultimately, the judges of the Supreme Court. that private object may be assumed to be this: Always, first of all, protect and sustain the interests of the United States Government, irregardless of the Constitution.
 

Thus, Rule 401 gives the judge of the court the power to allow into the proceedings of a suit any matters which the judge considers "relevant," instead of binding the judge to the leading maxim on legal evidence to a jury which the People who ordained and established the Constitution certainly intended by their delegation of the judicial power to the Courts of the United States, namely, to admit only "that which demonstrates, make clear, and ascertains the truth of the very fact or point in issue, either on the one side or on the other."
 

Rule 401 must be read carefully. By this rule the fact, to which the "relevant evidence" is to tend to make the existence of more likely than not, is not necessarily the very fact in issue in the cause of action, but any and all facts which the judge of the Court may consider as having any or some "consequence" to the "determination of the action." That can mean any matters of fact which the judge subjectively considers relevant to the termination of the action. Such extraneous matters which do not demonstrate, make clear, or ascertain the very fact in issue would cloud the very fact in issue in the suit, and would corruptly influence the jury to find not a true verdict, but a "verdict" grounded on probabilities, and theories of suspicion, and even remote probabilities, matters, again, which do not demonstrate, make clear, or ascertain the truth of the very fact in issue in the suit. Evidence on extraneous matters could also create confusion and doubts in the minds of the jurors, when the evidence on the fact in issue makes clear the truth of that fact.
 

Plainly, Rule 401 violates the meaning of the judicial power as the people who ordained and established the Constitution certainly intended, by the definition of the judicial power that was established by Blackstone's Commentaries on the Laws of England, "to examine the true of the fact" of the "injury" complained of, that is, plainly, the fact in issue, not other facts. Evidence of other facts do not make clear or ascertain the very fact in issue.
 

Moreover, by the Rule 401, "evidence" is "relevant" which merely tends to make the existence (not even the truth) of such facts "of consequence" more likely than not. So, the "existence" of the facts need not even be more likely than not, but having only a tendency of being more likely than not. Thus, the Rule 401 is a rule of remote probabilities. In this regard, we ought to consult again Blackstone's Commentaries. Said that learned author about evidence laid before a grand jury in a criminal prosecution,
 
 
 

"This grand jury ... are only to hear evidence on behalf of the prosecution: for the finding of an indictment is only the nature of an enquiry or accusation, which is afterwards to be tried and determined; and the grand jury are only to enquire upon their oaths, whether there be sufficient cause to call upon the a party to answer it. A grand jury however ought to be thoroughly persuaded of the truth of an indictment, so far as their evidence goes; and not to rest satisfied merely with remote probabilities: a doctrine , that might be applied to very oppressive purposes." (IV, Ch. 23, p. 300)
 
 
 

Plainly, therefore, Rule 401, and the related rules of evidence, are utter nonsense, and more, they are tyrannically dangerous, a total discretionary power in the hands of the judge to admit (and exclude) any matters he or she chooses, and steer the jury according to his or her bent, and also a license for a party of the suit to depose the other on whatever the judge allows, again, according to the bent of the judge and the secret motives and conspiracies of the party or his or her attorneys.
 

Hence, the Supreme Court's decreed Rules of Evidence and Rules of Procedure, allowed the District Court to compel Mr. Clinton to answer questions about any "sexual relations" with "other women" that he may have had, despite the facts that the essential fact alleged in the Paula Jones complaint, and in issue in the suit, was that Mr. Clinton made an "abhorrent" sexual advance to the plaintiff, and that she suffered job-wise for her rejecting that advance, thereby claiming a sexual harassment caused by Mr. Clinton. Surely, evidence about any "sexual relations" with other women which Mr. Clinton may or may not have had, could not demonstrate, make clear, and ascertain the truth of the alleged fact in issue in the Paula Jones litigation, namely, that the defendant had sexually harassed the plaintiff to her employment detriment. Yet, the Rule 401, together with Rule 26 of the Supreme Court's-decreed Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, allow a defendant to be deposed on, and compelled to answer, virtually any questions of his life, activities, possessions, relationships anything! and then later be found guilty on mere suspicion, or remote probabilities, of wrong doing. The leading maxim on evidence which Blackstone laid down, and which is the evident tenor of the Constitution, having been ordained and established with the aid of Blackstone's Commentaries on the Laws of England, would plainly disallow such questions in discovery in the Paula Jones proceedings, as questions about "sexual relations with other women."
 

The Blackstone law on evidence is that which the Constitution requires, by plain deduction. For the Article III grant of the "judicial Power" to the "Courts" of the United States can only mean that which the people who ordained and established the Constitution understood the judicial power as possessed by courts of justice to mean. And that meaning, again, is that which was laid down in Blackstone's Commentaries:
 

"In every court there must be at least three constituent parts, the actor, reus, and judex: the actor, or plaintiff, who complains of an injury done; the reus, or defendant, who is called upon to make satisfaction for it; and the judex or judicial power, which is to examine the truth of the fact, to determine the law arising upon that fact, and, if any injury appears to have been done, to ascertain and by it's officers to apply the remedy." (III, Ch. 3, p. 25)
 

The "fact" in this definition is plainly that, and can only be that, which is given in context, namely, the fact of the "injury" which the plaintiff "complains of", which becomes in issue when denied by the defendant, that is, "the very fact or point in issue," from Blackstone's "leading maxim" on evidence. Thus, the judicial power is to examine the fact in issue, not to inquire into other facts and judge a controversy on the basis of such other facts, as upon a theory of probability (such as a pattern of conduct theory), or whatever the judge considers, whether at the suggestion of a party or not, to be of consequence in the determination (or termination) of the suit, or worse still, on the basis of evidence merely tending to make the "existence" of such facts more likely than not, as Rule 401 permits.
 

To be sure, Article I, Section 8 of the Constitution vests in the Congress the legislative power in conjunction with Congress's enumerated powers, as to lay and collect taxes, to raise and support armies, &c.,
 

"To make all Laws which shall be necessary and proper for carrying into Execution the foregoing Powers, and all other Powers vested by this Constitution in the Government of the United States, or in any Department or Officer thereof."
 

The powers vested by this Constitution in the Government of the United States includes by Article III the "judicial Power," which is vested in the Supreme Court and the inferior Courts which Congress may ordain and establish. At first glance, one might casually suppose that this legislative power of Article I, Section 8, allows Congress to make the laws on evidence, hence perhaps a law which is less exacting than the law on legal evidence this is laid down, or expounded, by Blackstone, and even as completely liberal or arbitrary as the Rule 401 made by the Supreme Court. However, no such discretion power is granted to the Congress; for the laws which the Congress shall have power to make shall be both necessary and proper, a mandate from the People by the command language shall. A proper law on evidence can only be that which the people understood to be proper when granting the "judicial Power" to the Supreme Court and the inferior Courts which the Congress is authorized to ordain and establish. The law making power of the Constitution, thus, in relations to the courts of justice, is for making laws necessary and proper for carrying into execution the judicial power as the people intended the "judicial power" and "courts of justice" to mean, not laws that re-define the "judicial power" and "courts of justice," or what is meant by the object of the Constitution, "to establish Justice."
 

Therefore, it is necessary, in order to support the Constitution, to restrict the making of any laws on evidence in the proceedings of the Courts so as to conform to the definition of the judicial power and courts of justice which was established when the Constitution was made; namely, that a court being vested with the judicial power is to examine the fact of the injury complained of, not other facts. Blackstone's Commentaries on the Laws of England provide for us that proper definition; as it is plain, upon comparing Blackstone with our Constitution, that Blackstone's four volume treatise was used as the primary basis for composing the Constitution, including the first ten Amendments. As in the case of the Constitution of the United States, which was carefully formed and composed, Blackstone's Commentaries is very evidently a precise scientific treatise, not a casual and careless composition.
 

Moreover, the statute enacted by the Congress which gave the Supreme Court the power to make the "rules" of evidence, and the "rules" of procedure, both civil and criminal, violate the Constitution, since such "rules" are laws; and by the Constitution, Article I,Section 1, the legislative powers shall be vested in the Congress, not in the Supreme Court; and therefore, the legislative power to make the rules of evidence and rules of proceeding are not to be transferred to the Supreme Court without a manifest violation of the Constitution. The rules of evidence and the rules of procedure are plainly laws, and laws of the utmost gravity. The Supreme Court-decreed rules are not about the regular business hours of the courts, and other such mundane matters, but about what constitutes evidence: about compulsory depositions of parties: about abolishing the distinction between suits at law and suits in equity: about the Courts appointing whatever person they want to execute their writs, thereby usurping again the executive power of the Government: about denying the plaintiff the right to reply to the defendant's answer to the plaintiff's declaration of his case: about abolishing demurrers and pleas: about allowing contrived "defenses" that result in quashing the complaint without the Court hearing and determining the complaint: about dispensing with the trial by jury; and other such weighty rules that are now parts of the present Federal Rules of Evidence and Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. The Constitution, Article I, Sections 1 and 8, directs that only the Congress is vested with the power to make the laws which shall be necessary and proper for carrying into execution the judicial power, and this law making power plainly embraces laws defining legal evidence, the mode of proof, as by compulsive examination of the parties upon their oaths, the mode of trial, and the mode of relief.
 

In his discussion of the laws on evidence to be admitted to a jury, that is, "what is, or is not, legal evidence to a jury," Blackstone refers to a treatise for further study, titled "Introduction to the law nisi prius," where the expression nisi prius signifies a court which is held "to try by jury of the respective counties the truth of such matters of fact as are then under dispute in the Courts of Westminster." (III, Ch. 4, p. 57. In this quote, the word "matters" is used to denote a number of different cases to be heard and determined.) The word "legal" in "legal evidence" means the general definition of evidence established by law, not merely by a rule made by a court. Elsewhere in his Commentaries, when mentioning that the courts of law, as distinguished from courts of equity, are barred from compelling a party in a suit to submit to examination, Blackstone uses the words, "the judges [of a court of law] ... should be bound by law to reject a [this] species of evidence." (III, Ch. 23, p. 382) Thus again, rules of evidence are laws, part of the common law of England. A law, defined by Blackstone, is a rule of civil conduct prescribed by the "supreme power" of the state, by which he defined as the legislative power. The duty of the Court is "to determine the law" arising upon the fact in issue in a case, not to make laws (III, Ch. 3, page 25). Blackstone said in another place, under the laws of England, the judge "is only to declare and pronounce, not to make or new-model, the law." (III, Ch. 22, p. 327) Also, Blackstone does not use such expressions as "admissible evidence," or "relevant evidence," as are the expressions used in the Supreme Court-decreed rules of evidence to signify a discretion power of a judge to admit (or exclude) what evidence he (or she) thinks is relevant or admissible.
 

Therefore, the statute which authorized the Supreme Court to make rules of evidence, and rules of procedure, but which rules are properly speaking, laws, violates the Constitution, by giving over to the Supreme Court a legislative power which the Constitution expressly directs shall be vested in the Congress, not in any other department of the Government. Consequently, the Federal Rules of Evidence and the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure re unconstitutional on this point as well.
 

Furthermore, even had the Congress made the existing Federal Rules of Evidence, and the existing Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, such laws would not be proper. For one thing, they would violate the distinction between cases in law and cases in equity that is mandated by the Constitution, as in the compulsory discovery on the oaths of the parties in suits in equity, but which is not allowed in suits at law. For another thing, they would derogate the signification of legal evidence from that high standard which was deemed proper at the time of the making of the Constitution, namely, evidence "which demonstrates, make clear, or ascertains the truth of the very fact or point in issue, either on the one side or on the other; and no evidence ought to be admitted to any other point," in order to administer and establish justice, to such an arbitrary and oppressive low, as evidence of the existence of any fact considered by the judge to be of some consequence to the determination of the suit, and which evidence that merely tends to make the existence of that fact more likely than not; where the fact just spoken of need not necessarily be the very fact alleged as the cause of action, so as to give the judge to admit (or even exclude) virtually any matters of facts, and evidence of such, as the judge wants. This derogation violates the tenor of the Constitution, the intended meaning of the judicial power which the Constitution vests in the Courts of the United States. Again, the Constitution directs that the laws which the Congress shall have the power to make "shall be necessary and proper" for carrying into execution the powers vested by the Constitution in the Government, which include the judicial power. We are obliged, therefore, to make a truthful investigation of what the People who ordained and established the Constitution intended as to what would be proper laws prescribing the rules of evidence and the rules of proceeding in the Courts of the United States.
 

Therefore, upon the foregoing considerations, the Supreme Court enacted rules of evidence upon which the District Court ordered "relevant" the questioning of Mr. Clinton in the Paula Jones proceedings, conducted by the plaintiff's attorneys with the Judge taking part, about any "sexual relations" with "other women" that he, Mr. Clinton, may have had, are unconstitutional. Therefore, the order of the District Court in the Paula Jones suit compelling Mr. Clinton to answer those questions was illegal, founded on violations of the Constitution pertaining to (a) what constitutes legal evidence according to the evident tenor of the Constitution, (b) the mandated distinction in the Constitution between cases in law and cases in equity (compulsive examination of the defendant in the latter), and (c) which department is vested by the Constitution with the legislative powers.
 
 
 
 
 

4. Judge Wright's Order requiring Mr. Clinton

to submit to a Deposition and answer Questions

about "other Women," while deferring a Ruling

on whether such Evidence will be admissible at Trial,

is a further Nonsense, as well as unconstitutional,

and is indicative of oppressive Behavior of the Courts.
 

Judge Wright's order in the District Court proceedings in Paula Jones compelling President Clinton to answer discovery questions about any sexual relationships with "other women," while deferring a decision until a later time on whether or not the "evidence" that would be obtained by the compulsive examination of Mr. Clinton will be admitted at trial, is plainly nonsense, and yet, this nonsense is allowed by the Supreme Court-enacted Rules of Evidence and Rules of Procedure, specifically, Rule 26(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which prescribes the "scope of discovery," and Rule 402 and 403 on the admissibility of "relevant evidence." Rule 26(b):

"Parties may obtain discovery regarding any matter, not privileged, which is relevant to the subject matter involved in the pending action, ..."
 

From the Supreme Court's Rules of Evidence:

Rule 402: "All relevant evidence is admissible, except as otherwise provided by the Constitution of the United States, by Act of Congress, by these rules, or by other rules prescribed by the Supreme Court pursuant to statutory authority."

Rule 403: "Although relevant, evidence may be excluded if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury, or by considerations of undue delay, waste of time, or needless presentation of cumulative evidence."
 

As one can see, these rules permitted (but unconstitutionally) the District Court's order in the Paula Jones suit that Mr. Clinton submit to a compulsory deposition and answer questions of "sexual relationships with other women;" even though the judge could later in the proceeding, by the same rules, exclude that "relevant" evidence about "other women" from the jury trial for practically any reason that the judge may choose or decide upon, if it may be "misleading" to the jury, or "a waste of time," or "needless" cumulation of evidence, or "confusion of the issues." If the defendant denied under oath of having any sexual relationships with other women, should that not then be "relevant evidence" for the jury by the Rule 401, just as it would be "relevant evidence" if defendant admitted of having sexual relations with other women? By deferring until a later time a decision whether the "relevant" evidence obtained by the deposition may be excluded from the jury trial, proves that the Supreme Court's criterion for admissibility of the evidence is whether or not the judge (and ultimately the Supreme Court) likes the answers, a patent partiality, but which is allowed by the unconstitutional rules of evidence.
 

Such nonsense of Rule 402 and 403 is plainly oppressive and tyrannical. Observe also that Rule 403 allowed Judge Wright in Paula Jones to form her judgment of the admissibility at trial of the evidence of Mr. Clinton's deposition testimony on the basis prejudice, hence, possibly, prejudice against Mr. Clinton, that is, an oppressive partiality in the Judge's administration of the suit against Mr. Clinton, allowing her to exclude "relevant evidence" about any "other women" sexual relations only if its "probative value" is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice. So, the compulsive examination of Mr. Clinton can be prejudicial, in other words, a partiality against a defendant (Clinton), and even an unfair prejudice (a compounding of prejudice); but it can still be allowed, by the Supreme Court-decreed rules of evidence, as long as the "probative" value of the "relevant" evidence (defined by the rules as that "evidence" which may only tend to make the existence, not the truth of, a fact having some "consequence" in the mind of the Judge in the determination of the suit, more likely than not) outweighs the Judge's administered unfair prejudice against Mr. Clinton. The common law of England by Blackstone was that such behavior by any judge, or any other officer of the government, is criminal, an offense of oppression, the tyrannical partiality of a judge, a charge to be levelled also at the Supreme Court's judges who made those rules of evidence, and who have sustained them, and the members of Congress who authorized the Supreme Court to make whatever rules the Supreme Court pleases.
 
 
 

5. Presumption of tyrannical Partiality

of the Judges of the District Court,

the Appeals Court, and the Supreme Court

in the Matter of the Paula Jones Suit.
 

It is plain, therefore, that Judge Wright in the District Court, prepared by the Supreme Court's illegal, unconstitutional oppressive order that Mr. Clinton submit to the Paula Jones suit, reinforced by the unconstitutional force of coercion assumed by the Courts (ever present in the background) by the unconstitutional Supreme Court's marshal, an armed officer who is appointed, and removed, solely by the Supreme Court, as authorized by an unconstitutional statute, who is wholly subordinate to the Supreme Court, being duty bound to execute all orders of the Supreme Court, and whose statutory duty it was, therefore, to enforce the Supreme Court's order against the President of the United States, had illegally set up the President, Mr. Clinton, to be deposed on matters about his relationships with "other women" matters which could not make clear, nor demonstrate, nor ascertain, the fact alleged by plaintiff Jones as her cause of action that defendant Clinton sexually harassed HER, and which was the fact in issue of the suit, and interrogatories which were therefore prejudicial to Mr. Clinton, being probes into his deepest private life of utmost embarrassment to himself, and potentially embarrassing to his family, friends, and associates.
 

This court administered set-up laid a snare for perjury (temptations not to tell the whole truth), without evidently the least intention of the Court to administer a trial by jury, as was demanded by at least one of the parties (evidently by Jones, judging from her public statements). thus corruptly using the Paula Jones suit to create an opportune and contrived judicial proceeding for producing by illegal compulsion, and illegal rules of evidence, a bountiful supply of testimony from Mr. Clinton to be mined and gleaned for perjuries of not answering questions positively or fully by an illegal office of "independent counsel," unconstitutionally created for the criminal investigation and prosecution of the President and other high officers of the United States, and then dismissing the Paula Jones suit after Mr. Clinton's deposition was secured, the deposition of Mr. Clinton thus being the evident object of the support of the suit by those intermeddling in the suit with money, witnesses, and ideas for prosecuting the suit, including evidently an intermeddling by the Independent Counsel.
 

Such corrupt intentions ought to be presumed, inasmuch as the unconstitutional rules of evidence and rules of procedure decreed by the Supreme Court, rules which are plainly arbitrary and tyrannical, allow such intentions to be executed as perfectly "legal," and were the rules upon which the Courts have based their decisions in the case; and inasmuch as the Independent Counsel statute authorizes the independent counsel to "engage" in any civil suit as he considers necessary, which statute thus "authorized" the independent counsel to involve himself and his appointed deputies in the Paula Jones suit in any manner he pleases, as by private advices and dealings with the plaintiff's attorneys.
 

The fact issue in Jones v. Clinton was evidently, did the defendant sexually harass the plaintiff? Did the plaintiff Paula Jones suffer an ordeal of an unwelcomed, uninvited, and indecent sexual advance by the defendant in a hotel room with consequential emotional distress and marital difficulties, and also adverse consequences for her employment because of her rejection of the alleged advances for which the defendant was the cause? Such were the facts in issue in the case. The question then arises. Could information on whether or not the defendant had sexual relations with other women, and at other times and other places, be evidence that would demonstrate, make clear, or ascertain, that the defendant had sexually harassed the plaintiff as charged? Plainly not. Such information may have been "relevant" in the mind of Judge Wright, resting on the Rule 401 of the unconstitutional Rules of Evidence, in that the behavior of Mr. Clinton in relation to "other women" may be of some consequence (again in the mind of Judge Wright) in the determination of the civil suit, and that the deposition testimony could tend to make more probable than not the possibility that the defendant Clinton had "sexual relations" with other women; but such information would not demonstrate, nor make clear or certain, that defendant Clinton had sexually harassed plaintiff Jones.
 

And the information would not be legal evidence under the Constitution of the United States, apart from the fact that it was illegally obtained, by the method of compulsive examination of a party to a civil suit, in violation of the distinction in the Constitution between cases in law and cases in equity, as before discussed, because the Supreme Court's Rules of Evidence were made unconstitutionally (usurpation of legislative power), and could not be properly admitted as evidence; for it would be no evidence at all of the truth of fact of sexual harassment of the plaintiff, no evidence that demonstrates, makes clear, or ascertains the truth of the fact in issue in the case.
 

Furthermore, on the basis of Judge Wright's account of the facts as alleged by the plaintiff Jones, it appears doubtful that there was committed a wrong doing as charged. For by the judge's account, the plaintiff Jones (a woman) had entered alone a hotel room in which the defendant (a man) was allegedly present alone, and then engaged in "small talk" with the defendant for a "few minutes." Being alone with this man and find herself engaged in "small talk" for a "few minutes" ought to have been a sign of a personal sexual interest in the plaintiff (by sexual is meant, a man/woman interest), not a governor/state employee business interest, as the account has not Mr. Clinton promptly announcing official business matters, like asking the plaintiff would she be interested in a new employment position, or performing a special task. The judge's account goes on that Mr. Clinton allegedly took plaintiff's hand and drew her close (a sexual advance); whereupon she drew back and discussed personal matters, as about his wife, and then she "sat on a sofa." At that point, according to the judge's account, the defendant Clinton allegedly made a second sexual advance, which the plaintiff characterized as "abhorrent," in response to which she rose from the sofa, and left the room after an excited discussion. By this account of Judge Wright, it appears doubtful that the alleged second sexual advance, if it in fact occurred, was not invited to some degree. For when the first advance happened, by the alleged account, the plaintiff ought to have realized for certain that the defendant's interest was sexual (man/woman), and if she wanted no involvement, she ought to have immediately left the room, instead of sitting on a sofa, so as not to encourage a further, potentially more bold expression of sexual feelings for the plaintiff, as allegedly occurred, and with it a further embarrassment on both sides.
 

Therefore, the facts alleged by the plaintiff in the Paula Jones suit, according to Judge Wright's account, which plainly indicate a doubtful cause of action, gave all the more reason why the District Court (and the Supreme Court) ought to have yielded to Mr. Clinton's reasonable motion to dismiss the suit without prejudice to the plaintiff, permitting her to re-file the complaint, or just stay the suit, until he leaves the office of President of the United States, in order to respect and support the Constitution, particularly, the Article II, Section 3 directive that the President "shall take Care that the Laws be faithfully executed," and the President's oath "to the best of his Ability, to preserve, protect and defend the Constitution of the United States," when considering the obvious enormous responsibilities of the President of the United States under the Constitution, as the holder of the executive Power of the Government. For the suit did not charge Mr. Clinton committing any violations of the laws of the United States or the Constitution during his terms as President.
 
 
 

6. The Supreme Court with its Marshal

coerced the President.

The unconstitutional office of Marshal of the Supreme Court has illegally coerced Mr. Clinton to comply with the Supreme Court's order to stand the Paula Jones suit, and consequently to submit to examination and questions of "other women" in the District Court's ordered deposition, or face a criminal contempt citation, arrest by the Supreme Court's marshal ultimately, prosecution by the unconstitutional independent counsel, summary judgment, conviction and imprisonment (removal from office), all under the unconstitutional independent counsel statute.
 
 
 
 
 

7. The Question of the Jurisdiction

of the federal Courts to have Cognizance

of the Paula Jones Suit.
 

Finally, for completeness sake, the question of the authority of the federal Courts to take or accept jurisdiction of the Paula Jones suit ought to be addressed. Undoubtedly, the jurisdiction was assumed by the United States Courts on the basis of sections 1983 and 1985 of the United States Code, as the plaintiff founded its suit on the basis of these two sections of the federal laws, as well as the laws of the state of Arkansas. This author disputes such a claim of federal jurisdiction; but it is not necessary here to delve into that matter of jurisprudence, as the Paula Jones suit is a case which plainly arises under the Constitution of the United States (Article III, Section 2), inasmuch as the suit makes the President of the United States the defendant, and, thereby, involves the rights and duties of the President under the Constitution, requiring judicial decisions on dilatory pleas founded on the Constitution, as well decisions pertaining to process, including execution of judgment, and so forth.