Part VIII









The Independent Counsel's Prosecution

of the President of the United States

for alleged Crimes of Perjury

and "Obstruction of Justice."





Table of Contents




The Independent Counsel's Prosecution

of the President of the United States

for alleged Crimes of Perjury

and "Obstruction of Justice." 1



The "Independent Counsel" Statute 3



The improper Power vested in

the "Independent Counsel" by Statute

to intermeddle in civil Suits,

Which creates a Presumption that

the Independent Counsel, Mr. Starr,

had counselled the Plaintiff's Attorneys

in the Paula Jones Litigation

to interrogate Mr. Clinton on embarrassing Discovery

Questions (Temptations of Perjury),

and thereby lay a Snare for Perjury. 8



Abolishing the Offices of "Independent Counsel

and the Supreme Court's Marshal,

by the Act of the Presidential alone. 11



President ought to abolish the Office of Independent Counsel

and the Office of Supreme Court Marshal. 15





Part VIII







The Independent Counsel's Prosecution

of the President of the United States

for alleged Crimes of Perjury

and "Obstruction of Justice."



It is evident from Mr. Starr's "grand jury investigations," his Referral report to the House of Representatives, and his November 19, 1998 testimony before the House's Judiciary Committee that he is prosecuting the President of the United States for alleged crimes of perjury and "obstruction of justice." The Ethics in Government Act (28 U.S.C. §§ 591-599) fully empower the Independent Counsel to prosecute the President, though these investments of power are unconstitutional, as before demonstrated in Part I and Part II. The Independent Counsel is even empowered by the Act to intermeddle in civil suits for his (secret) purposes and prosecutorial objectives, such as setting up snares for perjury and "obstruction of justice" offenses.



The Independent Counsel, Mr. Starr, also made it rather plain in his testimony before the House Judiciary Committee that whatever the House of Representatives and the Senate may or may not do in regard to impeachment and removal of Mr. Clinton from office, he, the Independent Counsel, reserves and asserts the right and power to prosecute Mr. Clinton for crimes of perjury and "obstruction of justice," in the courts of the United States. In his testimony Mr. Starr stated in his discussion as to what constitutes "high crimes and misdemeanors" as grounds for impeachment by the House of Representatives:



"For these reasons, we concluded that perjury and obstruction of justice,like bribery, "may constitute grounds for an impeachment." Having said that, let me again emphasize my role here. We [Office of Independent Counsel] had a judgment to make. But whether the president's actions are, in fact, grounds for an impeachment or some other sanction is a decision in the sole discretion of the Congress.

A final point warrants mention in this respect. Criminal prosecution and punishment are not the same as, or a substitute for, congressionally imposed sanctions. As the Supreme Court stated in a 1993 case, the framers [of the Constitution] recognized that most likely there would be two sets of proceedings for individuals who committed impeachable offenses the impeachment trial and a separate criminal trial. In fact, the Constitution explicitly provides for two separate proceedings. The framers deliberately separated the two forums to avoid raising the specter of bias and to ensure independent judgment."(1)



This statement is consistent with the powers vested in the "Independent Counsel" by the Ethics in Government Act to prosecute the President for crimes. It is even conceivable that the Independent Counsel when prosecuting the President in courts that he may dispense with a grand jury indictment, and proceed instead with the information mode of a criminal prosecution in the courts, that mode being described in Blackstone's Commentaries on the Laws of England (Book IV, Chapter 23), which does not involve a grand jury. That is, the President could be, under the Independent Counsel statute, indicted, so to speak, by the Independent Counsel without a grand jury endorsement. Such is specifically provided for among the powers expressly conferred to the Independent Counsel by the Act, 28 U.S.C. § 594, which declares and directs that the Independent Counsel's "prosecutorial functions and powers shall include - ... (9) initiating and conducting prosecutions in any court of competent jurisdiction, framing and signing indictments, filing informations, and handling all aspects of any case, in the name of the United States." Then, there would be the question whether the trial would be by jury in the court proceedings on the formal accusation on information.



This Part VIII reviews the Independent Counsel provisions of the Ethics in Government Act more closely in respect to the above matters.





The "Independent Counsel" Statute

It is important to trace the real character of the office of "independent counsel" as created by the Ethics in Government Act.



1. The statute, 28 U.S.C., § 591(a), directs the Attorney General to "conduct a preliminary investigation ... whenever the Attorney General receives any information sufficient to constitute grounds to investigate whether any person described in subsection (b)," which subsection enumerates the "Persons to Whom Subsection (a) applies", as the President, Vice President, and any individual serving in a position listed in section 5312 of title 5, which includes the Secretary of State, of Defence, and other high officers of the Government, "may have violated any Federal criminal law; but that the Attorney General shall not have any power to issue subpoenas to compel testimony of witnesses to crimes and the production of documents and other things of evidence of crimes. If upon such a "preliminary investigation", the Attorney General determines that a further investigation is warranted, he or she shall apply to the "Division of the Court"(2) for the appointment of an independent counsel by the Division of the Court, and the Division of the Court shall then appoint an independent counsel of their own nomination and define his prosecutorial jurisdiction.



2. Once appointed, the independent counsel is empowered by the Ethics in Government Act to investigate the matter of his prosecutorial jurisdiction. The Act arms the Independent Counsel with the subpoena power, and with full power and authority to prosecute in the United States Courts the officer or officers of the Government as defined in his prosecutorial jurisdiction, including the President of the United States, if the articles of his prosecutorial jurisdiction should so specify.



3. The Attorney General can at any time remove the independent counsel for "good cause," but in that event the independent counsel can apply to the Courts in a civil action to have his appointment as independent counsel "re-instated," or be granted other "appropriate relief," which could be anything which the Courts decide to grant. Or, the Division of the Court could merely appoint a replacement independent counsel; and until the office of Independent Counsel is filled again by either the reinstatement or a new appointment by the Division Court, the Division Court shall appoint an "acting independent counsel." In other words, the office and powers of the independent counsel, including his "prosecutorial jurisdiction," continues as directed by the Division of the Court, despite the "removal" of the independent counsel by the Attorney General.



4. The independent counsel is authorized to conduct his investigation of possible federal crimes and mere suspects of crimes before a grant jury, thus thrusting the grand jury into the role of a criminal investigator and prosecutor, as distinguished from its proper, constitutional agency as a judicial body a tribunal for enquiring of the indictment preferred by a prosecutor.



5. The independent counsel is armed with all the powers of criminal investigation and prosecution held (legally or illegally) by any officers of the Department of Justice, including the Federal Bureau of Investigation, and is empowered to command the assistance of any such officer. On the basis of such power the independent counsel Mr. Starr has, reportedly, ordered FBI agents to secretly obtain statements of Miss Lewinsky by a hidden microphone attached to the person of Linda Tripp and arranging for her to meet and confer with Miss Lewinsky with the ensuing conversation secretly recorded. This proceeding is in plain contravention to Amendment V of the Constitution, which prohibits compelling any person in a criminal case to be a witness against himself. As Miss Lewinsky had evidently refused at times to testify before Mr. Starr's grand jury "investigation," the independent counsel's action to obtain statements from Miss Lewinsky surreptitiously reveals the extent of the measures taken by the independent counsel in exercising his unbounded authority and powers as are prescribed by the Ethics in Government Act.



6. The Chief Justice of the Supreme Court assigns (appoints) judges to comprise the Division of the Circuit Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia that appoints the independent counsel and defines his prosecutorial jurisdiction; and the Supreme Court Chief Justice is not barred from judging any matters reaching or ordered up to the Supreme Court, regarding the independent counsel and his prosecutions, including a criminal case against Mr. Clinton. Moreover, the Chief Justice, by Article I, Section 3 of the Constitution, is to preside over any impeachment trial of the President. The conflicts of interests undertaken by the Chief Justice are evident.



The above survey of the powers conferred to the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court, the Courts of the United States, the independent counsel, and the Division of the Court, make it clear that the independent counsel is truly vested with independent power to investigate and prosecute the President of the United States for alleged crimes, subject to the superintendence of the Division of the Court and the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court, and ultimately, the Supreme Court. Although the Attorney General initiates the process of the appointment of the independent counsel by the Division of the Court, the law is written in such a form that the Attorney General is essentially obliged to apply to the Division of the Court for the appointment of an independent counsel, since the statute precludes the Attorney General from making an adequate investigation into information or allegations of criminal wrong doing by a high officer of the United States, the Attorney General being precluded by the statute from having the power "to issue subpoenas" for fact discovery in such cases. This Author asks the question: Are subpoenas the same as warrants for search and seizures mentioned in Amendment IV of the Constitution? Amendment IV declares:



"The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized."



If so, then it would appear that the Independent Counsel statutes precludes the Attorney General from obtain a search warrant.



7. The Ethics in Government Act authorized the independent counsel to conduct an investigation of alleged or possible criminal behavior of officers of the United States "before grand juries." Rule 6 of the present Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure empowers and directs the court of jurisdiction in criminal proceedings to summons "grand juries" "at such times as the public interest requires," a "rule" also made by the Supreme Court, not the law making authority under the Constitution. Amendment V of the Constitution prescribes that



"No person shall be held to answer for a capital, or otherwise infamous crime, unless on a presentment or indictment of a Grand Jury, ..."



The grand jury, however, is not instituted and authorized by the Constitution for the purpose of participating, or joining in, a "criminal investigation" that is, an investigation into possible or suspected crimes; but rather, the grand jury is a tribunal, a judicial body, instituted for the purpose of privately receiving indictments, preferred by a prosecutor, and then privately enquiring into the evidence of criminal wrong doing which is laid before the grand jury by the prosecutor with his bill of indictment, and hearing only the evidence on behalf of the prosecution. That is, before an inquisition is performed by the grand jury, the proper investigative officers of the executive department of the government must have already determined on the evidence obtained in their investigation, framed an indictment, accusing a named person of committing such and such crime, and then preferred the indictment to the grand jury, before the grand jury can enquire into the matter of the alleged wrong doing. By this proper procedure the grand jury is not to be associated and collaborating with the criminal investigation prior to indictment, so as to take on the character and interest of a prosecutor of persons for crimes, but instead is to be an impartial tribunal for a trial of the evidence laid before it by the prosecutor with his bill of indictment, a judicial office, not a prosecutorial office. If the grand jury upon its enquire into the evidence laid before it is thoroughly persuaded of the truth of the indictment, and judges of the guilt of the person accused, then they are to endorse the indictment; whereupon, the person accused then stands indicted, and then is to be brought to the court to answer the indictment. If he shall plea not guilty to the indictment, he shall then be tried by a petit jury, a second jury who shall enquire into the evidence of both sides.



Thus, the grand jury together with the petit jury are, by the Constitution, to provide a two-fold barrier against groundless or malicious criminal prosecutions. Therefore, as the Ethics in Government Act authorized the independent counsel to conduct criminal investigations before a grand jury, the statute is triple unconstitutional, and more dangerous to the cause of justice, human liberty, and individual rights, and injurious to the society, since it not only stirs up strife, but it removes one of the barriers before mentioned.



8. Finally, the issuance of a subpoena on the President by the independent counsel to testify before a grand jury is a violation of the Amendment V of the Constitution, which directs that no person shall be compelled to be a witness against himself. The proceedings of the grand jury is, by the Constitution, only to enquire into the evidence laid before it on behalf of the prosecution, and not also on behalf of the accused (see Blackstone's Commentaries, IV, chapter 23). Therefore, the testimony which the accused person would give to a grand jury, if compelled to appear before the grand jury and answer questions, could only be taken as evidence against the person. Consequently, subpoenaing a person accused of a crime, or suspected of committing a crime, to testify before the grand jury must be, and is, a compulsion of that person to be a witness against himself; and, therefore, such a subpoena violates the Amendment V. As Amendment V declares that no person shall be compelled to be a witness against himself, it is plainly a violation of that Amendment directive to compel a person, to order a person against his will, to appear before the grand jury for the purpose of taking his testimony. The Amendment V does not allow an accused person to be dragged before the grand jury, only to hear him refuse to answer questions, by "pleading" the Fifth Amendment.



Likewise, the use of secret microphones to obtain statements from persons suspected or prosecuted for crimes is a violation of the Fifth Amendment of the Constitution; for such surreptitious taking of evidence plainly flouts that Amendment.



9. The granting of "immunity" from criminal prosecution to any person who is investigated by the independent counsel, called a "witness" by a federal Court, and the power vested in the independent counsel by the Ethics in Government Act to apply to the Court for such grants of immunity, plainly contravenes the Article VI of the Constitution that directs that the Constitution, and the laws which shall be made in pursuance thereof, shall be the supreme law of the land. The Courts are not to be partial in the administration of the criminal proceedings before them. The laws are to be faithfully executed, hence, uniformly executed, not "in some cases, but not in other cases": Not with partiality against a one person, with favoritism of other delinquents with a grant of immunity from criminal prosecution in return for testimony against the unfavored person. That ought to be plain.



Moreover, the "Ethics in Government" Act even provides for the reimbursement of attorney fees incurred by witnesses who are not indicted, thereby, corruptly influencing witnesses who are threatened with an indictment to testify upon a grant of immunity from criminal prosecution, knowing that not only would they be given immunity privilege upon testifying against the unfavored person, but their attorney fees (now enormous expenses running into the millions of dollars) would be paid as well. The common law of England at the time of the formation of the United States made such supports of witness a crime, called maintenance. The independent counsel statute appears to have many improprieties indeed; all stemming from its unconstitutionality.













(continue)



The improper Power vested in

the "Independent Counsel" by Statute

to intermeddle in civil Suits,

which creates a Presumption that

the Independent Counsel, Mr. Starr,

had counselled the Plaintiff's Attorneys

in the Paula Jones Litigation to interrogate Mr. Clinton

on embarrassing Discovery Questions (Temptations of Perjury),

and thereby lay a Snare for Perjury.



The "Independent Counsel" statute, chapter 40 of Title 28 of the United States Code, vests in the Independent Counsel "full power and independent authority" to investigate and prosecute certain "persons," including the President of the United States (§. 591(b)), for possible violations of federal criminal laws, which



"investigative and prosecutorial functions and powers shall include ... participating in court proceedings and engaging in any litigation, including civil and criminal matters, that such independent counsel considers necessary." (28 U.S.C. § 594)



This specification of power vested in the Independent Counsel is in addition to the power



"of initiating and conducting prosecutions in any court of competent jurisdiction, framing and signing indictments, filing informations,(3) and handling all aspects of any case, in the name of the United States; ..."



The Independent Counsel's power to participate in any court proceeding, and to engage in any civil litigation the independent counsel "considers necessary" is a wholly vague, and therefore, a wholly indefinite power. The word engage is, by Black's legal definition, is to involve oneself. The word participate is to take part in some manner. Therefore, by this section of the statute, the independent counsel has been empowered throughout his investigation of "potential" or "alleged" violations of federal criminal laws by Mr. Clinton to involve himself or his deputies, that is, to intermeddle, in the Paula Jones suit in any manner which the independent counsel may consider necessary.



Because of the fact of this express discretion power vested in the independent counsel by statute, the presumption arises that the independent counsel had engaged his office in the Paula Jones suit in some manner, no matter how circuitously and secretly, so as to cause Mr. Clinton to be examined on extraneous, and highly embarrassing, matters of "sexual relations" with certain "other women," and thereby excite and tempt him into committing perjury, and subornation of perjury a kind of inducing a person to commit the crime of perjury, in order then to prosecute him for that crime. Such entrapment ought to be considered a crime itself, like the offence of "common barretry," "the offence of frequently exciting and stirring up suits and quarrels between his majesty's subjects, either at law or otherwise." (Blackstone's Commentaries, IV, Ch. 10, p. 133)



It might not be possible ever to find out the truth as to whether or not the independent counsel, or any of his deputies or representative has in fact so intermeddled in the Paula Jones suit; but the fact that the independent counsel is empowered to intermeddle, by the vaguely defined power to "engage" in any civil litigation as he shall consider necessary, is sufficient for the presumption, a presumption for excusing Mr. Clinton of any perjury he may have committed related to the matter of "other women." Also, the substantially evident fact that the independent counsel engaged to record secretly a conversation between Linda Tripp and Monica Lewinsky (a secret microphone placed on Mrs. Tripp with her cooperation to draw Miss Lewinsky in a conversation) reinforces the presumption. Blackstone's definition of criminal perjury is as follows:



"The perjury must also be wilful, positive, and absolute; not upon surprise, or the like: it also must be in some point material to the question in dispute; for if it only be in some trifling collateral circumstances, to which no regard is paid, it is no more penal than in the voluntary extrajudicial oaths before-mentioned." (IV, Ch. 10, p. 137)(4)



What could Blackstone mean by "or the like"? The word absolute means not depending on anything else. Therefore, we may assume that a perjury is not criminal if it is mixed up with a deliberate plan to excite the deponent into perjury by interrogations on extraneous matters? An independent counsel investigating the President for possible or alleged crimes can have no valid or proper interest in "engaging" in a private civil litigation. A proper, lawful criminal investigation, conducted by an officer of the Government, could properly investigate a civil proceeding to determine whether or not perjury had been committed in that proceeding; but a power to "engage" in any civil litigation that the independent counsel considers necessary, is a different sort of power a license to intermeddle to lay perjury traps, and the like, or to do whatever the independent counsel considers necessary: to engage, hence, to involve himself, in the civil suit in whatever manner he considers necessary, as to suggest a line of questioning, and offer of witnesses, and evidence.



According to the Independent Counsel's Referral report, information on influencing witnesses attributed to Miss Lewinsky came to the independent counsel's office on January 12, 1998, and Mr. Clinton's deposition was taken on January 17, making it temporally possible that the independent counsel or his deputies or other agents engaged surreptitiously in the Paula Jones suit by suggesting questions for Mr. Clinton's deposition. The report indicates that stories and allegations of "other women" were published before the "witness list" for the plaintiff of the Paula Jones suit was drawn up.



As the District Court judge in Paula Jones had ruled that Mr. Clinton can be questioned about "other women," even without determining that such matter is material or "relevant" to the Paula Jones complaint (an improper ruling in this Author's view and is a presumption in itself of an improper partiality against Mr. Clinton by the Court judge), one can suppose that the independent counsel saw in such ruling a license to engage in the Paula Jones suit by setting up a perjury "sting" or snare (before the expansion of the independent counsel's prosecutorial jurisdiction) on the dubious rationalization that the President's private sexual behavior may have a relevance to the articles of his prosecutorial jurisdiction, as testimony relating to the "character" or "credibility" of Mr. Clinton, as he alone decides the necessities for his engagements in any civil litigations.



These plain possibilities, and very suspicious probability (in view of the use of the secret microphone), all arise because of the plainly unconstitutional independent counsel statute and the office it erected, vesting the Independent Counsel with virtually unlimited power to do whatever he judges necessary, thus even to conspire with other intermeddlers in the Paula Jones suit to excite a defendant in a civil cause to commit acts which the independent counsel would then seize upon as a ground for a criminal investigation and prosecution, namely, an act of perjury. Thus, the illegal, unconstitutional independent counsel statute corrupts the due administration of justice that the Constitution was established in part to provide for.



To conclude, the unconstitutionality of the independent counsel statute makes illegal the power which the independent counsel possessed by the statute to "engage" in any civil litigation, and that power may be presumed to have been employed to snare the Mr. Clinton into committing perjury, and, therefore, this presumption ought to exclude the possibility of corrupt perjury that is, criminal perjury of having been committed by him.



It should also be noted that Mr. Clinton was illegally required to submit to a compulsive examination in the Paula Jones suit, and was illegally required to answer questions on extraneous matters as "other women," because the Federal Rules of Procedure, conferring to each party of suit the right of compulsory discovery by the oath of the other party, and the Federal Rules of Evidence, allowing evidence as relevant for discovery purposes and trial, as that which "tends" to make "more probable" the "existence" of any fact considered by the judge to be "of consequence" in "the determination of the action," are both unconstitutional, as is demonstrated elsewhere in this present treatise.



Abolishing the Offices of "Independent Counsel

and the Supreme Court's Marshal,

by the Act of the Presidential alone.



As the statute which created the office of "Independent Counsel" and also the office called the "Division of the Court," erected to appoint the "Independent Counsel" and define his prosecutorial jurisdiction, is unconstitutional, and as the statute which created the "marshal" of the Supreme Court, appointed and removed by the Supreme Court alone, and whose duty is to execute all process and orders issued by the Supreme Court, is also unconstitutional, the United States Government ought to take action, and is hereby petitioned by this Citizen to take action, to abolish these three offices. The President of the United States has the pwoer to take this action alone; as he is bound by oath to preserve Constitution of the United States. The Constitution also directs the President that "he shall take Care that the Laws be faithfully executed;" and Article VI of the Constitution directs that all the laws that the Congress may make shall be made in pursuance of the Constitution. Therefore, since the statutes which created the offices of "Independent Counsel," the "Division of the Court," and the Supreme Court Marshal are unconstitutional, the President ought to take care that those laws are not executed, especially also since those offices all unconstitutionally interfere with the office of President, the Department of Justice, and the Courts of the United States.



The President is vested with the executive power of the Government, not the Supreme Court, nor the "Independent Counsel," nor the Marshal of the Supreme Court. The executive power is the power (1) to execute the lawful commands of the Constitution, including attending to the Congress and the Courts of the United States, to take care that those Departments of the Government can execute their powers, and carry out their duties under the Constitution; (2) to execute the laws which were made in pursuance of the Constitution; and (3) to execute the lawful judgments of the Courts of the United States. The executive power is the power to act to preserve, protect, and defend the Constitution of the United States, as the President is vested with the executive Power, and his sworn duty is to "preserve, protect, and defend the Constitution of the United States," as well as to execute faithfully, to the best of his ability, the Office of President.



The Courts of the United States are vested only with the judicial power (Article III of the Constitution). It may be noted the interpretation of the powers of the Supreme Court under the Constitution given in The Federalist, quoted as follows:

"Whoever attentively considers the different departments of power must perceive that, in a government in which they are separated from each other, the judiciary, from the nature of its functions, will always be the least dangerous to the political rights of the Constitution; because it will be least in a capacity to annoy or injure them. The executive not only dispenses the honors [offices] but holds the sword of the community. The legislature not only commands the purse but prescribes the rules by which the duties and rights of every citizen are to be regulated [including the President and the executive officers of the government]. The judiciary, on the contrary, has no influence over either the sword or the purse; no direction either of the strength or of the wealth of the society, and can take no active resolution whatever. It may truly be said to have neither force nor will but merely judgment; and must ultimately depend upon the aid of the executive arm even for the efficacy of its judgments." (No. 78)



A law, said Blackstone, is a rule prescribed, commanding what is right (which includes, naturally, what is to be done that is right), and prohibiting what is wrong. The judicial power, said Blackstone, renders judgments, the judgment is the sentence of the law: The judicial power determines the law arising upon the fact of a case, the very fact in issue; and execution follows immediately the judgment. But the President is the officer under the Constitution who is to take care that the commands of the law are faithfully executed, including the commands of the court for the execution of judgment, being the sentence of the law. The judgment of the court, thus, is the more specific command of the law (a reiteration of the law) that pertains to the case adjudicated. Thus, by the Constitution of the United States, the Courts are to be vested only with the judicial power, and no portion of the executive power.



In Blackstone's British Constitution, the judges had more than the power of judging, but the power of commanding the execution of judgment, by writs directed to the sheriff. However, under the Constitution of the United States, the President is vested with the entire executive power, and is to take care that the laws are faithfully executed. The Courts are vested only with the judicial power, which includes the power to determine the law in particular cases, hence, to determine what the law commands in particular cases of dispute. It follows, therefore, that the writs of the Courts ought to prescribe the lawful command as to what shall be done, but without commanding any particular officers to do it; though the laws made by the Congress ought to prescribe the proper subordinate executive officers who shall execute the judgments of several Courts of the United States, but subject to the supervision and direction from the President, the chief executive magistrate; for he only is vested with the executive power of the Government, by the Constitution. (The original law of 1789 establishing the "judicial Courts" of the United States was defective in this respect.)



If the President, however, should determine that a court judgment, or a statute, is unconstitutional, he ought not execute such. That is plain; for he is bound by oath to preserve the Constitution of the United States. If the House of Representatives, however, deems that the President, by refusing to execute a court judgment, has acted in contempt of court, and if contempts of court were prescribed by law as a criminal offence (and such are), then the House of Representatives could and ought to impeach the delinquent President. Of course, the President would have to be prepared to prove his determination of the unconstitutionality of the courts judgment, or a law made by the Congress. Better, though, the President, when confronted with unconstitutional court judgments or laws, ought to recommend to the Congress for their consideration measures which he, the President, shall judge necessary and expedient to nullify the disturbing unconstitutional statutes or unconstitutional court doctrines claimed by the Courts to be law.



Yes, the Supreme Court is vested with the judicial power; but they have no power granted to it by the Constitution to execute their judgments. This feature of the Constitution pertaining to the restricted power of the Courts of the United States was plainly intended to confine the executive power to the person of the President alone, thus providing the President with the executive power to check any usurpations by the Supreme Court.



The word take in Article II, Section 3 of the Constitution prescribing the President's duty that "he shall take Care that the Laws be faithfully executed," is the duty to use the executive power, the power to perform, to employ the force of the society in the execution of the laws: to take the care, that is, to act without anyone else having to give permission: to seize in his hands the execution of the laws, including the execution of the judgments of the courts as to the sentence of the law in particular cases.



On the basis of the foregoing principles and the whole proof given in the present treatise, the President ought to act, and is urged to act, as follows:



1. Block all money payments to the Independent Counsel office, the Division of the Court, and the Marshal of the Supreme Court.



2. Issue writs to the Independent Counsel and the Supreme Court Marshal and their subordinates abolishing their commissions, and commanding them no longer to interfere in the business of Government.



3. Impound all the material generated and acquired by the office of Independent Counsel, including documents, papers, computer files and storage media, and transfer custody to the United States Government in the care of the Department of Justice; and take possession of any and all firearms which those officers and their deputies may have acquired by their offices.



4. Formulate the measures which he judges necessary to deal with the defect in the laws as discussed above and in pursuance of the Constitution, and recommend them to the Congress for their consideration.



Also, the Congress ought to make all the laws necessary and proper for carrying into execution the judicial power vested by the Constitution in the Courts of the United States, including making proper rules of proceeding and rules of evidence, for the proceedings of suits in the United States Courts suits at law, suits in equity, and criminal suits being distinctly different and taking care to ensure that the rules that they make conform to the tenor of the Constitution, or the evident intent of the People who ordained and established the Constitution as tothe meaning of the judicial power and the proper rules of proceeding and rules of evidence consistent with that true, intended meaning.



The Supreme Court of the United States is not the supreme Magistrate of the United States. by the Constitution, the executive Power is vested in the President of the United States; and so, the President ought to use that power to preserve the Constitution.







President ought to abolish the Office of Independent Counsel

and the Office of Supreme Court Marshal.

It is be concluded that the President, with the assistance of other proper executive officers of the Government, ought to act to abolish the office of Independent Counsel, and the office of Supreme Court marshal. The President ought then to appear before the Congress with information on the state of the Union, and lay out the unconstitutionality of the office of Independent Counsel, and Supreme Court Marshall, and recommend measures which he shall judge necessary and expedient to deal with the situation. The Congress should realize that the information, testimony transcripts, videos, objects, etc, that have been generated by the Independent Counsel were all illegally produced, as it is absolutely clear that the Independent Counsel is an unconstitutional office, as is the Division of the Court that appoints him, and defines his prosecutorial jurisdiction, and as is the Chief Justice's powers to appoint the judges to such Division of the Court. Thus, the present matter of the present impeachment and trial of President Clinton can be orderly and responsibly dealt with:



(1) By the President exercising the executive power of the Government which he alone is vested with, assisted by the duly and lawfully appointed officers as the Attorney General and other proper executive officers, disregarding any Supreme Court orders to the contrary, should the President determine that such orders violate the Constitution, and not assume that the Supreme Court can execute orders against the President. For Article II, Section 1 vests the executive power in the President alone, so that any executive officers must be subordinate to him.



(2) By fulfilling his constitutional duty to inform the Congress of the state of the union, and recommend measures which he shall judge necessary and expedient to deal with the unconstitutional Ethics in Government Act.



And (3), by the House of Representatives, and the Senate, if need be, dealing with the material which the House has now accepted and disseminated to the public. And since the office of Independent Counsel is unconstitutional, the simplest and straight-forward disposition which the House of Representatives ought to give the report which the Independent Counsel, Mr. Starr, has laid before that house, is to treat it as an illegally generated document, and therefore, requiring and deserving of no ipso jure enquiry proceedings of the nature of an impeachment enquiry. Indeed, the report of the "Independent Counsel" ought to be investigated as part of an investigation of the possible and suspected illegal or improper activities related to and surrounding the Independent Counsel's investigations, including the involvements of the Chief Justice of the United States, and of the judges appointed to the Division of the Court, as well as an investigation of the unconstitutionality of the Independent Counsel statute. This citizen sees it all as one sorry mess created by a violation of the principles and precepts of the Constitution, and which ought to be rectified. I would urge no punitive actions, just write it off as a bad idea, and get on with setting things right.



Foremost, each member of the Congress, each executive officer involved in the matter, and each judge of the Courts of the United States, ought to investigate the true meaning of the Constitution. It would be proper in this regard that there be a renewed oath required, following exactly the form of the oath of section one of the first statute under the United States, "I will support the Constitution of the United States."





1. It is also significant to point out that Mr. Starr states that the Supreme Court in a 1993 case stated that the framers of the Constitution intended in effect that the President could be prosecuted in the Courts of the United States for crimes "independent" of an impeachment of the President. Here again, we see that the Independent Counsel asserts in effect a rule of law that the Supreme Court makes laws for the United States, which in his "Legal Reference" in the Appendix of his Referral report he calls the "common law" (of the United States). As demonstrated elsewhere in this present Treatise, the Supreme Court has not constitutional power to make any laws; and as demonstrated in Part II of this treatise, the impeachment is the peculiar and exclusive mode of the prosecution of officers of the United States: that any criminal prosecution in the courts of the United States of an officer of the United States can only be undertaken after the party is removed from office on impeachment for, and conviction of, high crimes and misdemeanors, as provided for by Articles I and II of the Constitution.

2. 2 The "Division of the Court," is an office associated with the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia, consisting of three "judges" appointed by the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court.

3. 3 The expression "filing informations" probably means the presentment to a Court of a formal accusation of a crime without the intervention of a grand jury, as an information is one of the species of a criminal prosecution that is mentioned in Blackstone's Commentaries on the Laws of England, Book IV, Chapter 23, on "the several Modes of Prosecution."

4. 4 This definition of criminal perjury is different than the present federal law on perjury. However, the present United States law is defective, as demonstrated in this Author's original treatise on the unconstitutionality of the Independent Counsel statute, dated August 18, 1998.