Solution systems require resources, but system existence, reliability, and effectiveness are also dependent on the components that result from those resources. System components may be physical things such as buildings, vehicles, and people; or they may be more abstract things such as plans and procedures. System components take inputs such as resources and turn them into outputs that are related to the system objectives. If all is working well, the components consistently perform within the constraints of the underlying principles.
Components perform functions intended to meet the system objectives. There are usually connections or interfaces among a system's internal components, but there may also be many interfaces with external systems. Since external systems may be working against as well as for a system's objectives, it is important to know where the interfaces with external systems are located.
Working together, and as influenced by interfaces with the components of other systems, internal system components perform functions that help to solve a problem or meet a need. Components are organized, arranged, or sequenced to perform their functions based on certain principles that make the overall system as reliable as needed to meet the system objectives.
Special interest groups can not be effective internal components of a good solution system. At worst they will at some point during the system life cycle cause the system to fail. At best, special interest systems present a continuous threat of solution system interference as soon as their objectives or principles conflict, so they can be involved only across insulating interfaces. Even then everything contributed by a special interest group is inherently suspect and is generally limited under Technidigm-2000 to being no better than level one opinions. Level one opinions have little impact on level four solution systems.
In some cases, facts contributed by special interest groups may include some level two facts and even level three research information, but these contributions must be viewed as incomplete and distorted. Also, simply obtaining input from two opposing special interest groups may not be sufficient to provide a complete set of level two facts or level three research. Thus, solution system components that attempt to operate in such a polarized information environment are likely to fail at some point in the system life cycle.
Level four solutions must apply available information and resources to system components. System components are designed to function across the widest possible set of competing issues or problems. Solution system components include only those items or entities that have a useful function in achieving the system objectives. We should be able to state the function of every component, and that function should be accomplished as efficiently as possible. A special interest group simply functions to promote its own objectives, so it is almost always going to be a negative if allowed to be a component in a solution system.
This approach of using contractor resources as solution system components is better than doing nothing, and it creates at least an artificial integrity. Keep in mind that if we are to meet solution system objectives using contractors as system components, then it is necessary to ensure that the contractor objectives are met as well. While it is possible to force a contractor to complete the agreed-to tasks even at a financial loss, it is not likely that the contractor will be motivated to raise emergent considerations in an adversarial environment.
Time and context impact a project over its life, so at least some of the details of the original contract will usually have to be adjusted if the intended objectives are to be achieved. Contractors often make most or their profits on change orders that become necessary over the project life-cycle. Thus, it is important to pick contractors that have real integrity as well as profit-driven integrity. The low bidder may not be the least expensive option.
The political atmosphere often imposes special interest group objectives on government employees. That is, anyone who "rocks the boat" even in a level four solution system in an effort to meet system objectives is likely to get into political trouble within a government organization if the system objectives are not consistent with the current political objectives. We now refer to such people as "whistleblowers," a word that is now so common that it need not be hyphenated. We even have come to assume that a whistleblower's government career is over or sidetracked even without knowing anything about the issue that they raised.
Whistleblowers exist primarily in top-down organizations. Government offices are more often top-down organizations rather than the bottom-up systems needed to achieve the best technical results. Government projects are usually organized along the same lines as the government itself, so the human components of those projects may adversely affect level four solution systems. This condition will exist as long as polarized politics exist in government.
Technidigm-2000 discourages political polarization by encouraging a common sense approach to politics at the grass-roots level, as intended by the framers of the U. S. Constitution. The bottom-up approach turns the organizational pyramid upside down, making it more apparent who supports whom in getting things done. Efficiency in government would improve significantly if government agencies simply issued their organizational charts with the elected and appointed officials at the bottom.
With this technical slant on common sense in mind, each citizen can participate as a component in the solution system created by Technidigm-2000. Many of us will participate willingly in this solution system, but others have become numb to our current social and political environment. There are also those who have failed to achieve the basic educational qualifications needed to understand Technidigm-2000, even with a "free" education that is not-so-free to taxpayers. Thus, many Technidigm-2000 grass-roots participants will have to be motivated much like government contractors are motivate -- with money. This is why the Technidigm-2000 community's solution system collects annual dues and offers awards, grants, and student scholarships.
Moreover, the communication or connection between each component also becomes a critical factor impacting system success. That is, it does little good to have two reliable components in series or in parallel if they are not well connected to other system components. Moreover, in most systems it is the human communication elements that fail most frequently. Indeed, the success of the human components of solution systems is often dependent on the clear and unambiguous flow of information, one of the results of using the four Technidigm-2000 communication levels. Again, levels only help with communications when people are on-the-level and are trying to achieve the best results for all concerned.
Even when each person is on-the-level, the human components in the system can fail. We depend on the best efforts and good intentions of those people who serve as solution system components. The integrity of each person involved with system functions directly impacts system reliability, and each person often has the ability to cause overall system failure. To minimize unintentional human errors and failures, we often need redundant sources of information. People interact with each other using information as their input, output, and feedback, so there are many opportunities to get information wrong.
For example, nuclear power plant operators can be very conscientious and still do things that might result in safety problems. Indeed, most problems at nuclear power plants are caused by human errors. This is why the nuclear industry emphasizes "defense in depth." Each human action is double checked, recognizing that the human element as being the most likely source of problems. Each communication is repeated back to ensure that it was received and understood. Nuclear plant operating, test, and maintenance procedures are followed verbatim.
While many hardware components must fail before the nuclear reactor safety envelope is penetrated, it only takes one poorly trained person or an impatient operator to defeat the safety envelope -- unless each person is well trained, closely supervised, and guided. Personal integrity is essential in nuclear plant operators. Consequently, a nuclear plant operator who demonstrates a negative safety attitude is very likely to be fired immediately. Likewise, political interference with nuclear plant safety standards can not be tolerated. Nuclear plants have a unique "safety culture" that must be constantly reinforced. Plant managers are expected to fire any nuclear plant employee who demonstrates a negative safety attitude or who criticizes or attempts to intimidate a safety inspector. It is beneficial to all of us to have such high safety standards at nuclear power plants, but such standards are not effective in the absence of personal integrity.
In a complex technical society, there are many activities other than nuclear power plants that require the highest standards of integrity and circumspectness. For example, chemical plants, the airline industry, automobile manufacturers, and food processing companies all must maintain high standards. To the extent that such industries fail to maintain high standards, the safety of thousands or even millions of people can be compromised. As with nuclear plants, people are often the "components" that fail in these industries, resulting in increased government regulation and, thus, increased taxes and problems for all of us.
It is usually helpful to draw a diagram of solution systems, showing the arrangement of the system components and the system interfaces with other systems. Engineering systems are designed based on tradeoffs between complexity and reliability, optimizing the system performance within the available resources. Solution systems should be designed the same way. Every component and interface needs to be consistent with design principles, an approach to compatibility and consistency that enables the various systems to work together efficiently. From the opposite perspective, a solution system will fail as soon as its least reliable component fails unless there is a redundant backup component available and ready to compensate for the failed component.
Of course, the more components that there are in a system, the more likely one or more of them will cause the system to fail. Complex systems are hard to design, build, and maintain, motivating us to try to minimize the number of system components and to keep their interactions with each other simple. Interactions between components and between systems occur at their interfaces with each other, so it is important to establish and maintain the right kinds of interfaces. In engineering systems, the interfaces are usually some type of physical connection. In social systems, the interfaces are usually some type of communication. In good systems, each interface is designed to establish communication compatibility between the two components, even when they are bringing together components and systems that are otherwise incompatible in design and function.
Interfaces are required between system components and between separate systems. For conflicting social systems, the communicating interfaces can be mediators or arbitrators. The primary function of an interface is to establish understanding, the key precursor to establishing cooperation across the interface in achieving system goals, assuming that this is possible. In any case, the failure to establish a good communication interface can lead to serious problems. Indeed, a communication problem can be found in most technical as well as social problems even when everyone involved is on-the-level. Thus, anyone who is not on-the-level is automatically a potential interface problem for those who are on-the-level. Technidigm-2000 faces the personal integrity problem directly by making non-polarized good intentions the basis for good citizenship.
The theory behind 12-person juries is that it is pretty hard for everyone on the jury to be wrong -- not impossible, just difficult. The intent is to have 12 people from different backgrounds perform as members of the jury (a component of a level four legal solution system). The 12 jurors assess facts and sort out all of the opinions presented to them in court. If all 12 people have identical backgrounds, it becomes easier for the jury to be wrong. Ideally, the 12 members of a jury should be noticeably different from each other and should include the widest range of backgrounds possible.
Similarly, 12 parallel components performing the same function in a system can reliably ensure that the function is carried out, especially if 12 different manufacturers made the components. When components are designed differently we can avoid what engineers refer to as common-mode failures. It is not likely that 12 components produced differently will have the same defect and fail under the same conditions.
The use of 12 parallel components is a standard well beyond that used even in the safety of nuclear weapons or in safety systems of nuclear power plants, where reliability is an absolute must. The fact that we have come to believe that it takes 12 jurors for the human decision making process to be reliable speaks volumes regarding human fallibility. People are often the weak link in any human effort, so it does not hurt to have additional backup or redundancy, depending on the consequences of failure.
The concept of common-mode failures and the reliability comparison of juries with engineering systems reveal the importance of the process for selecting the members of 12 person juries. As implemented today, the jury selection process has become one more problem area for us since juries are screened by the opposing lawyers in a manner deliberately intended to skew the jury one way or the other. Prospective jurors who could conceivably be prejudiced against a defendant are easily removed, but those who may be friendly are likely to be considered "peers" of the defendant, thus more capable of "understanding" the defendant. Fortunately, even when skewed one way or another, juries are usually reliable and fair.
This juror selection arrangement causes the judicial system, if it is to fail, to fail more often on the side of the defendant while making the offended party's task more difficult. This unbalance is the "design intent" of the jury system. Thus, even if we could demonstrate frequent failures of the jury system, as long as the failures protected the accused individuals from undue punishment, the jury system is considered to be successful.
Indeed, juries and judges are the level four components with which we are most familiar. The lawyers representing the opposing sides in a case are polarized special interest groups, so the information provided by one or both sides is very likely to be off-the-level and incomplete. Regardless of the solution system, the results must be consistent with its defined principles and objectives for that system to meet its design intent. In spite of all the possible defects and examples that we can assemble, the jury system is generally considered to be one of the best systems available to protect people from other people and from the governments established by people.
The reason that the jury system is so well established and viewed as being successful is that people have been refining it for thousands of years. Judicial refinements are based on feedback and lessons learned from many other forms of judicial systems. In contrast, the framers of the U. S. Constitution had a lot of historical basis for creating a new form of government rather than a refinement of previous forms. Likewise some religions are based on thousands of years of experience regarding what works best for people and for society.
Juries, constitutions, and religions are not perfect, but they provide people with level four starting points for avoiding or mitigating human failures, starting points that are difficult to improve upon. From the Technidigm-2000 perspective, many of the current difficulties associated with these kinds of fundamental institutions are the result of our failure to keep up with the influences of technology. In particular, social conditions are changing a little faster than the feedback from those changes can be identified, collected, assessed, and acted upon. The 12 Technidigm-2000 elements provide the communication framework within which we can catch up!
Solution systems that fail to meet their objectives often lack one of the elements shown in this diagram. It is easy to be so focused on the operation of components that the overall solution system strays relative to its objectives. Straying can be minimized by feedback as long as the evaluation of that feedback continues to apply the guiding principles in a consistent manner. The level four evaluators and decision makers must also consider any new facts and changes in context on a continuing basis.
Unfortunately, this common sense approach is difficult to sustain in a society flooded with level one opinions and off-the-level special interests. While it is possible to construct a level one solution system, the flood of equally valid level one opinions and special interests quickly overwhelm solution systems that are also based on opinions and special interests. This is because there is no basis for selecting one set of opinions or special interests over the others. Any negative feedback regarding a level one solution system is reason enough to cancel and replace the entire system. After all, there are many well-meaning people already participating in level one solution systems, unaware of the alternative. Even for those who are aware, there is no easy mechanism for requiring people to develop level four evaluations and establish level four solution systems.
As in engineering systems, every component in a social issue solution system has a function to perform, a specific function that is deliberately established in the solution system design phase. Later, the ability of each component to perform its assigned function as intended is monitored and tested. Each component is operated and maintained accordingly in later stages of the system's operating life.
Where resources are not sufficient for detailed monitoring, a sampling process may be needed. This is where the Technidigm-2000 elements of time and context are applied. The additional Technidigm-2000 element of feedback is addressed in the next section of this chapter, but it should be apparent by now that many of the Technidigm-2000 elements work synergistically with each other. In any case, all of the 12 Technidigm-2000 elements should be reviewed or assessed at every opportunity, especially when problems arise.
Engineering systems have a limited design life, after which the system is not intended to be capable of operating efficiently. Upon reaching the intended end of life, the entire system should be updated, replaced, or (if no longer needed) retired. While some social programs are modified during their life, they are seldom retired even when their primary goals have been met.
Under Technidigm-2000, all social solution systems are closely monitored, and system retirement schedules are implemented. System retirement planning is accomplished during the early system design stages, long before fielding the system. If we wait for a system to fail before we address its problems, we may have also failed to achieve the solution system objectives. In particular, system resources can be wasted relative to the benefits achieved.
The persistence of social programs to live beyond their time is due largely to the unique human aspects of social programs. While engineering systems usually only require human operators and maintainers to oversee component hardware, the components in social solution programs themselves are often human. Engineering components have no vote as to when the system must be retired.
The social program human components not only have a vote, they often have a vital interest in maintaining the program forever. These vital interests can only be dealt with effectively when the associated human expectations are consistent with the system operational goals. This means that the human expectations must be consistent with plans for system and component retirement and consistent with the system output criteria used to provide feedback to the control system. When the human components are not motivated in a manner consistent with the level four solution system, the system can fail simply by surviving too long.
Said another way, a system functions most efficiently when the human components have goals consistent with the program objectives. Anyone who has turned in an automobile to a dealer for maintenance and repairs knows that the dealer will always want to do more work than the owner. The dealer wants to maximize the transaction, and the owner wants to minimize the transaction. The end result may be a better automobile, but the difference in costs relative to the amount of improvement will be significantly different. There is usually a range of diminishing returns that must be considered, but the party with the most technical information and direct experience usually prevails.
Social programs can also be seriously impacted when perfection is pursued at the expense of efficiency and common sense. Moreover, since the human elements of programs will fight for program survival and their own self interest, there is a tendency to create additional social programs to achieve the same result. The old programs compete with new programs for resources. The goal is survival and not efficiency, a condition that encourages off-the-level communication and results in an unmanageable level of confusion. The path of least resistance for overlapping government-sponsored social programs is often the one that results in increased taxes.
All social program similarities and differences need to be understood and assessed as systems, usually over the entire lives of the programs. Systems that include people as functional components require continuous level four leadership to be successful in attaining the system goals. Human components of systems should be viewed as special interest sub-systems. Just like other special interest systems, their goals may not be consistent with the solution system goals and its life-cycle plans. Nevertheless, the needs and expectations of the human sub-systems need to be addressed just as vigorously as the maintenance needs of the non-human system components. Level four solution systems and programs address these needs through planning, training, and leadership.
The greater the number of people involved in or impacted by the system, the more important is the role of leadership. For leadership to be successful, it must be based on consistent, reasonable, and (to the extent feasible or practical) fair principles. Indeed, the overall reliability of a solution system is critically dependent on the integrity of its decision-making leadership. Fairness implies integrity.
Integrity is to solution system leadership what component reliability is to mechanical and electrical systems. A solution system will fail as soon as its weakest leadership component fails to maintain its integrity, unless there is a redundant leadership component in place to detect and to compensate quickly for the failed leader. Thus, while the performance of engineered systems depends on the consistent application of the appropriate engineering design principles, the performance of social solution systems depends on the consistent application of the appropriate social system principles and leadership.
Nevertheless, there are important similarities between engineering components and social system components. These similarities involve component arrangements and interfaces. The simplest of these arrangements are best described with a diagram.
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