The first three "dimensions" are what we use to locate ourselves relative to some frame of reference. Two of the three dimensions are like north-south and east-west. They are useful for things like maps. When we add altitude, we get a third dimension. This third dimension helps us locate things like airplanes.
Yet we can not find an airplane at a three-dimensional location unless we know its schedule and unless that airplane is meeting its schedule. Thus, time is the "fourth dimension." Timing is as important as physical location, and for some situations it can be more important.
These are somewhat obvious points, but they have profound applications. For a given issue, reference points are initially at least as numerous as the number of people involved. When we start reducing the number of reference points we achieve a more common frame of reference. When this happens, it becomes increasingly possible to reach a consensus on an agreeable solution system for an issue. Technidigm-2000 provides an approach to achieving a common frame of reference for most issues.
This explains the usual result of political decisions -- compromise. We too often confuse the more elegant concept of consensus with the semi-failure state of compromise. Compromise occurs when we are forced to make a decision in the absence of consensus. Technidigm-2000 promotes consensus over compromise by inserting its 12 key elements into the discussion.
When we take the time to assess an issue in terms of the Technidigm-2000 12 elements, we are taking the time needed to reach consensus. When all of the participants in the assessment are familiar with these elements, consensus can be reached more quickly than compromise, even if some of those participants are polarized.
Such philosophical observations point toward what is perhaps the most significant mystery of the Universe, that of existence. If we eventually discover how time relates to the Universe, then we will better understand why the Universe exists. At that point we will also understand how mankind and its notion of a central Manager fit into this Universe.
Some of the more critical issues faced by mankind may not reach resolution in time to allow the issue of existence and the exact nature of time to be resolved. In the meantime, the nobility of our issue resolution efforts is time dependent. We need to optimize the parameter of time in dealing with both small and large issues. To the extent that common sense methods such as Technidigm-2000 facilitate efficient issue resolutions in this technological world, our ability to achieve Godly endpoints is enhanced.
Unfortunately, technology advances may continue to accelerate and may increase rather than decrease the common sense gap. This is the gap between common sense as it currently exists and common sense as it would exist if we had sufficient time for our culture to absorb fully the effects of each technological advance. We seem to be increasingly interested in closing this gap, but we do not yet agree how to achieve this. Technidigm-2000 provides a neutral framework for achieving a consensus on technical common sense and for accelerating the closure of the common sense gap.
The processes needed to solve problems are also dependent on time for their success. Yet, waiting does not always result in improvement. Without positive corrective actions along the way, problems may just languish in time and start to grow -- they can get worse.
Solutions take time to work, so it is necessary to watch those solutions and to look for areas where improvement is needed. Feedback allows corrective actions to be defined and implemented. Feedback is discussed further in another chapter of this book.
Time is needed for most projects to be successful. Just as it takes about nine months to produce an independent human baby, some things just can not be rushed. Also, they can not always be delayed successfully. Each potential mother and father has a limited "window of opportunity" for producing offspring.
Such familiar issues as raising families are instructive in our understanding of time. Time and timing can be critical to success, but a range of approaches and results may be described as being acceptable and even highly successful. Some time-related constraints can not be changed, but many time-related constraints are artificial and may even be self-defeating.
As in many modern issues, technology has increased our options in raising families, and it appears to be on the verge of making "family planning" an exact science. The consequences of such new options afforded to us today may not be fully appreciated for several decades. Technidigm-2000 encourages the exploration of new options within a framework of principles and objectives, compensating for our lack of experience in new arenas by maximizing our application of the experience that we do have in older arenas.
Although this seems like a tenuous adventure as we start down such a path, our readiness to look at the results and to make adjustments as we go makes the adventure less threatening. Also, our ability to accept several versions of success and to think in terms of gradually increasing the level of success as we go make the path more agreeable.
The goal of continuous improvement in nuclear safety is also impacted by certain cyclic phenomena that occur primarily at the individual plant level. When a nuclear plant is graded by Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) inspectors as being below average in its various technical and management areas, the plant owners may pour additional resources into improvement programs in an effort to say off the NRC "watch list" of poorly performing plants. When the assessment improves, the same managers might cut back on those resources.
It is difficult to "justify" large maintenance and inspection budgets in a plant that is operating so well that it does not appear to need all of this extra effort. It is also difficult to anticipate exactly what level of effort is needed, and there is always someone in the organizational chain of command who will insist on cutting corners somewhere. This profit-and-loss driven cycle is well recognized in the nuclear industry. Nevertheless, there are still lifely to be nuclear safety cycles at either a single nuclear plant or for all the plants operated by a given nuclear utility company.
Thus, the nuclear industry provides an object lesson in how our best efforts can be defeated by the introduction of inappropriate drivers. The profit-and-loss environment does not lend itself to perfect solutions simply due to the laws of diminishing returns. When perfection and profits co-exist as somewhat opposing objectives, then an additional element may be needed. In most cases, the additional element is some kind of independent regulation, usually by a government entity.
In the case of nuclear plant safety, the NRC derives its power primarily from the threat of shutting down a plant or imposing monetary fines. The NRC thus represents a polarized counterbalance to nuclear utility interests. Unfortunately, the NRC can not conduct a comprehensive inspection at every nuclear plant every day. Indeed, they can barely conduct a general inspection every 18 months. Even then, NRC inspectors are only allowed to indicate what is wrong, not what to do about it.
Different plants get different inspectors and different findings, but each plant may react differently even to the same findings. Even when they elect to react to similar issues in similar ways, they may wait for different periods prior to doing anything. This makes it difficult for the NRC to track what each plant is committed to do and when they are supposed to do it.
Inspection cycles introduce corresponding performance cycles. Plant managers "get ready" for inspections, and they may let performance slip between inspections. Thus, even in the nuclear energy business there are several different cycle drivers that can result in significantly different conditions relative to ideal goals. This is just one more example of the problems that can emerge when we try to do difficult tasks in a polarized environment.
It is important to have objectives, but it is also important to provide time to achieve those objectives. President Kennedy set the man-on-the-moon objective, but he also suggested a reasonable but challenging amount of time to achieve it -- by the end of the decade. Between the time that an objective is identified and the time it is actually achieved, there may be thousands of obstacles to overcome.
Also, the timing of most efforts is best considered relative to achieving the applicable objectives. Some are day-to-day objectives and others may take many years to achieve. Objectives will be discussed on more detail later, but they constitute one of the twelve parts of Technidigm-2000. Objectives and the results of our efforts toward those objectives must be considered within their context, which also changes with time.
We do not send a child to college until that child is ready to go, but most of us realize that there is an optimal time to do so. Yet, people successfully go to college over a wide range of ages. Just because the timing is not optimal does not mean that the objectives will not be met or that we should not try to accomplish a task.
Failure is always a possibility. Setbacks are also likely. Effort does not guarantee success, it only makes success more likely. The wise use of time also makes success more likely. Contrary to all of this time-dependent thinking, one of our biggest problems in solving problems is that some people think the job is done as soon as the task is approved for action. We see presumption of accomplishment every time the president signs a bill into law.
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Cross Reference to lots of details on Time Management: Time Management
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